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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the use of demand driven dispatch in the hub and spoke
environment prevalent in the route networks of major airlines in the United States.
Demand driven dispatch is an operational mode where aircraft assignments can be
changed in response to variation in demand. A computer program simulated the
functions of a revenue management system and an optimal aircraft assignment routine
over the course of the passenger booking process. An isolated hub with service
exclusively between the hub and 15 spoke cities was assumed.
Two series of quantitative studies were done, one looking at the possible profit
improvements at various demand levels with demand driven dispatch and the other
examining the sensitivity of demand driven dispatch results to when the first and last
optimal reassignment of hub aircraft was made in the booking process. In the first series,
comparisons were made between results obtained from static aircraft assignments and
fully dynamic demand driven dispatch assignments. Several scenarios were simulated.
These involved various combinations of demand distribution, demand balance, and
booking process assumptions. Booking process sensitivity studies were performed on a
small subset of the scenario combinations. A discussion of practical issues which could
affect implementation is also included.
Results show that demand driven dispatch performance is fairly uniform regardless of the
scenario with the best projected yearly profit increases for a major hub and spoke
operator of $35-$40 million over the current fixed assignment practice. This occurred at
load factors similar to airline historical levels of 65%. The profit increases at normal
demand levels were achieved mostly through better aircraft utilization patterns (lower
costs) and not revenue enhancement. At higher average load factors demand driven
dispatch improvement was less significant but was always positive. Studies on when
demand driven dispatch was applied during the booking process showed that major
benefits could be gained by evaluating assignments even once as long as this assignment
period preceded any significant level of high yield passenger booking requests.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Much has been written over the past few years about the financial woes of the
airline industry. How poorly have the airlines performed? Losses over the past three
years alone top $9 billion just for the domestic U.S. carriers.1 What are the root causes of
the industry's difficulties? For airlines in the United States, the current list of items is
long and varied. Among the most cited reasons are high costs, low yields, overcapacity
relative to demand, government mishandling of bankruptcy laws, foreign competition,
and, of course, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
With the outlook of the industry not likely to improve in the near future, does it
make sense for the major carriers like American, Delta, and United to consider exiting the
industry for strategic reasons? It has been the topic of discussion at many board
meetings, and rightly so. If these firms choose not to formulate and implement bold and
creative solutions to deal with ever changing market conditions, then they would indeed
be doing a service to their shareholders to dissolve their companies. After all, there are
airlines which have managed to make money and even prosper while the rest of the
industry has suffered these horrendous losses. Most notable is Southwest Airlines, a
Dallas-based carrier which has adopted a strategy of low frills, low costs, and high
frequency service. Southwest has been profitable the last 18 years, and is the only major
airline in the United States which had positive net earnings in 1992. As an indication of
the paralytic state which the other majors find themselves, even though Southwest
presents a significant threat to erode their market shares, they have yet to define a strategy
to check Southwest's growth.
Many of the successful innovations which were introduced by individual carriers
since deregulation, like frequent flyer programs and super saver fares, have lost their
effectiveness to boost primary demand for travel. These programs benefit an airline only
over the short term because they are easily replicable and therefore not sustainable
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competitive advantages. What is a sustainable competitive advantage is an organization's
ability to continuously bring to the market cost effective innovations which the market
will embrace. This thesis examines an airline operational philosophy which meets the
previous criteria in that it goes beyond the traditional way of executing a flight schedule
while at the same time lessening the negative impact of what is perhaps the greatest
external impediment to sustained profitability in any organization, variation in demand.
In particular, the subject of this thesis is demand-driven dispatch (D3) in a hub and
spoke environment typically found in the United States today. First developed by
Boeing 2 , demand driven dispatch is a dynamic aircraft assignment procedure which
utilizes the detailed and constantly updated data in the revenue management system in an
attempt to increase airline profits relative to the current fixed aircraft assignment practice
by more closely matching seat capacity to passenger demand.
The discussion in this thesis will commence with a background section on the
evolution of the current route structure and a review of previous work on demand driven
dispatch. The final sections of the thesis discuss computer simulations which illustrate
the potential magnitude of benefits to the airlines, specific issues which would have to be
addressed in order to convert to a D3 operational mode, and a set of conclusions
addressing the overall merit of such a shift.
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Chapter 2: The Development of the Hub and Spoke System
2.1 The Era of Regulation
In the days when airline travel was regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), airline route networks reflected point to point service offered along trunk, or high
demand, routes. Airlines tended to provide air services within confined geographical
regions. Indeed their names alluded to the areas of the country where a company's
service was focused. There are numerous examples: Eastern, Southern Airways,
Western, Northwest Orient, Piedmont, etc. Carriers could be further classified into those
whose route networks were primarily east-west (United) or north-south (Eastern), but
there were no airlines that were truly national in terms of complete coverage of the
country. Airlines were assured steady financial returns and little competition under the
benevolent stewardship of the CAB. With no motivation to strive for organizational
efficiency, airline costs gradually drifted upwards. Inevitably, fares rose as well to cover
the cost increases.
In part because of the recognition that bureaucratic oversight of the airline
industry did not maximize benefits to the traveling public, the U.S. government in 1978
dissolved the CAB with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. For the first time
airlines were free to serve markets and set prices at their own discretion. Filings for new
airline operating licenses rose tremendously in the aftermath. New carriers with low fare,
low frill service, People Express Airlines for example, were enthusiastically embraced by
the public. The established carriers that offered more traditional levels of service faced
the prospect of large declines in passenger traffic and were forced to seek new operational
and marketing strategies which would allow them to retain their passenger base in a cost
effective manner. Innovations like super save fares and frequent flyer plans were
introduced. It was also in this newly competitive environment that the hub and spoke
system began to flourish.
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2.2 The Hub and Spoke Solution
What was so appealing about the hub and spoke system? The answer is that it
gave the airlines the ability to serve a large number of markets with relatively few




12 aircraft can serve
156 markets.
aircraft. Consider a generic hub with n spokes similar in layout to the one in the Figure
2.1. Each spoke city is linked via the hub to n markets comprised of the other n-I spoke
cities and the hub itself. For passengers beginning their trips in the hub city, there are an
additional n markets to consider. Thus, over all spokes there are a total of n(n+l) markets
or origin-destination pairs which can be served with n aircraft. The arrival and departure
of aircraft at the hub must obviously be sequenced to provide enough time for passengers
to connect to other aircraft. The window of time when all the aircraft are present at the
hub and passenger transfers occur is commonly referred to as a connecting bank or
connecting complex.
Another advantage of hub and spoke networks is that they allow airlines to
operate fewer models of aircraft which can efficiently service flight legs of varied
distances from the hub. This results in greater scheduling flexibility. Also, these aircraft
are usually jets, which are desirable from a level of service perspective, not small
propeller driven planes. Larger jet aircraft feeding traffic (passengers) into the hub can
routinely be filled regardless of the local market being served by the aircraft because of
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spoke passenger opportunities to connect to numerous market destinations beyond the
hub. Non hub operations of a similar schedule, in contrast, would not only require many
more aircraft but aircraft of various capacities to match market size.
Today's hub and spoke systems are clearly an integral part of an airline's flight
operations. The statistics below give a sense of the magnitude and scope of hub and
spoke operations at Delta Air Lines.
Number of Hubs - 9 (5 major, 4 minor)
Percentage of system-wide flights originating or terminating at hub - 90%
Typical number of aircraft in a connecting bank - 30
Maximum number of aircraft in a connecting bank - 65
Typical number of connecting banks per day per hub - 8
Maximum number of connecting banks per day - 10
Recent bankruptcies of carriers who had been operating in the pre-deregulation
era points to the importance of the hub and spoke system as an indicator of sustainable
success in the 1980s. Those airlines which recognized the market and cost efficiencies of
hub operations from the outset have managed to survive the initial shakeout period.
Prominent examples are the "Big Three" - American, Delta, and United. Many airlines
who were late or negligent in establishing a strong nationwide hub and spoke system
have exited or are in the midst of exiting the industry. Airlines in this category include
Pan American, TWA, and Eastern. For Pan American and TWA it was a clear problem
of failing to grasp the importance of establishing feeder systems for their vast overseas
route networks. Eastern, possibly because it had no choice but to concentrate on
resolving labor issues, never grew its hub and spoke system beyond a couple on the East
Coast.
2.3 Is the Hub and Spoke System Obsolete?
In the past few months the cost effectiveness of hub operations has come into
question. The most outspoken person on this issue has been American Airlines Chairman
Robert Crandall. He feels that part of the responsibility for American's losses rests upon
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the failure to account for higher costs incurred when routing passengers through a hub
relative to the costs of point to point service. Specifically, Crandall argues that "hubs
require the presence of a large number of employees and an infrastructure to handle the
periodic bank of flights, which have sent airport costs soaring." 3 While this might be
true, a counter argument might highlight other contributing factors to losses like low
demand, ill-conceived pricing schemes, and overcapacity. Also, there are several studies
which completely contradict this notion. Kanafani and Hansen 4 find that "airlines with
strongly hubbed route systems incur roughly the same cost to provide a given amount of
transportation as those with less hubbed systems, controlling for other factors." In other
words, if the accounting were done correctly, one would find that the greater market
reach of the hub and spoke system versus point to point can be achieved with little or no
cost penalty.
Regardless of the whether this is the core problem for American Airlines or not,
Crandall's contention that hubs are more costly to operate in general should be addressed.
Indeed the key motivation for this study of demand driven dispatch is to evaluate its
potential for increasing profits in a hub and spoke network. A.J. Reynolds-Feighan in her
doctoral dissertation 5 on the effects of deregulation on route network concludes at one
point that "for these hubs (where the carrier has a dominant market position) a better
matching of equipment with passenger demand and route length is the most important
aspect that can lead to improved efficiency levels." For all intents and purposes, this
statement is an endorsement of the demand driven dispatch philosophy.
Point to point service is making a bit of a comeback today with new entrants like
Reno Airlines, Kiwi, and the yet to be certificated Family Airlines. One should
understand that this is not an indictment of the hub and spoke system. The markets these
airlines are targeting justify this level of service. Airlines operating hub and spoke
systems offer nonstop service in selected markets as well. However, hubs are by far the
most effective method to link the greatest number of smaller markets with the fewest
-13 -
number of aircraft. If hubs are not turning a "profit", the airline should reexamine the
allocation of seats to markets (aircraft size) as well as the way they are being used (D3)
before they abandon the hub and spoke system prematurely.
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Chapter 3: The Evolution of Demand Driven Dispatch
3.1 Problems Inherent in Current Aircraft Assignment Process
Airlines typically fix the flight schedule on either a monthly or seasonal basis.
The aircraft type assignments and tail number routings are also simultaneously set on the
basis of the outcome of a network optimization mathematical programming routine.
There are several drawbacks with this approach. Principally, the solution depends upon
either forecasted or projected demand. Forecasting relies upon methodologies which
estimate future demand based upon past traffic data while accounting for factors like
seasonality, day of week, special events like holidays or the Super Bowl, and the time of
day. Projections in this context are subtlely different in that they estimate demand for
new flight services or a changing competitive environment. Projections also are a
function of the aforementioned factors applied not to past traffic data, which would
reflect an invalid competitive model, but rather to theoretical demand relationships which
are based upon market size and flight frequency. In either case the results are never
wholly accurate.
Another inherent problem is caused by the use of deterministic data in the
assignment process. A more sophisticated approach might include some probabilistic
techniques to assess spill potential. Spill is a measure of the level of passenger requests
for air travel which cannot be met. However, current practice does not account for the
situation where, for example, a specific flight has mean demand of 100 (adjusted for the
various factors) where the actual demands are 65 and 135.
Demand-driven dispatch creates a flexible assignment environment which
converts this variability into an opportunity to increase profits rather than the settling for
the current situation of demand spill and low average load factors. In the above example,
a demand driven dispatch-controlled system would have advance knowledge of flights
where passenger demand was projected to vary significantly from the expected level.
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This information would come from a revenue management system which monitors
among other items deviations from historical or forecasted booking patterns for every
flight. A D3 optimization routine would then look for feasible aircraft assignment swaps
which would result in an increase in operating profit for the airline. A feasible
assignment would be one that in the context of the overall schedule could be executed
with little impact to other operational areas like crew scheduling and maintenance.
3.2 Demand Driven Dispatch as Means to Sell Airplanes
Demand drive dispatch was introduced by the Boeing Company primarily as a
vehicle which allowed the company to exploit its 'family of aircraft' product line
advantage. A manufacturer is usually selected on a repeat basis by an airline customer
for reasons like airframe/engine commonality, which reduces spare parts inventories and
maintenance costs, and savings on flight training. Over time each major aircraft
manufacturer has recognized the importance of the family concept and has acted to
expand their product line accordingly. Examples of manufacturers and their family
concept are show in Table 3.1. The aspect of flight training commonality across aircraft
Table 3.1: Airframe Manufacturers Aircraft Families
Manufacturer Aircraft Family Range of Capacities
Boeing 737-300,400,500 108-148
McDonnell Douglas MD81,83,85,87,88 115-145
Airbus A319,A320,A321 115-180
Fokker F70,F100,F130 70-137
British Aerospace RJ70,RJ85,RJ100 70-125
families is the most critical for D3 operations to be successfully conducted. The reader
may have noticed that any mention of changes to the scheduling of flight crews has been
absent from the discussion. This is not an unintentional omission. Under D3 the flight
crews will still be flying their preassigned flight legs regardless of the member of the
aircraft family at the departure gate. This can be only be done if aircraft families are
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designed with similar cockpits in order to qualify for certification by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in the category of "common type rating." This essentially means
that the flight crew is legally allowed to fly any aircraft in the family without any sort of
intervening training. Without this stipulation, D3 would not be possible.
3.3 Why the Airline Industry Needs D3
There is a checklist of characteristics whose presence, absence, or extent in an
industry will easily allow even a person with a layman's knowledge of economics to
quickly determine the prospects for long term profitability in that industry. Included on
this list are relative level of fixed costs, barriers to entry, nature of variability in channels
of distribution, perishability of the product, and differentiability among competing
products. Where does the airline industry fit in this picture? Before I answer this
question, let us examine industries/firms at two extremes and speculate about their
chances for success in economic terms. At one end of the spectrum is a software
company like Microsoft. Its products require little capital to develop (a few computers),
are considered in many cases to be the best available as well as industry standards, last
for years (MS-DOS and Excel), and are in high demand. Their fortunes at least over the
next few years are relatively secure. Now consider the independent fishermen. Their
boats are relatively expensive, anybody with the inclination and money can enter the
business overnight, both the supply of and demand for fish is variable, a fair portion of
their catch dies before reaching market, and a fish is difficult to brand. Under these
circumstances it is almost miraculous if a fisherman makes any money at all.
Unfortunately for the airline industry, it more closely resembles commercial
fishing than software design. For the airlines the situation is as follows. On the positive
side of the ledger, starting an airline is not a trivial task. While the used aircraft market
today is certainly a buyers market, the management of a new entrant still must deal with
Federal Aviation Administration operating approval, distribution costs through
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competitor-owned customer reservation systems, gate availability, and, in some cases,
landing slot restrictions. The good news for prospective airline moguls ends there. New
jet aircraft represent a large capital investment, anywhere from 20 to 120 million dollars
depending on the capacity and range. While the supply of seats can be controlled,
passenger demand at a disaggregate level is not highly predictable. An airline's product,
available seat-miles, perish upon departure if not sold. Any new service features can be
quickly copied by the'competition, effectively preventing branding.
Much of what is seen in the industry today is driven by these industry
circumstances. While fixed costs are high, marginal costs are low. This observation, in
combination with perishability and importance of low cost to the passenger for air
service, leads to the never ending fare wars. In an area of concern to this paper, airlines
have also invested heavily in revenue management systems in order to better cope with
the stochastic nature of passenger demand. Revenue management systems serve to
determine seat availability in different fare classes with the objective of maximizing
revenue. The number of seats allocated to each fare class is based upon the mean demand
for the fare class, the variance of the demand, and the fare itself. However, one must
realize that using a revenue management system is only an acknowledgment of
variability, not a solution to eliminate it. Even with revenue management systems in
place, on average over 30% of airline seats in the United States fly unfilled each day!
Demand driven dispatch is to aircraft seat supply like revenue management is to
passenger demand, but they are not substitutes for each other. To ideally maximize
profits a firm must be able to exert some control over both supply and demand. In fact,
differential pricing mechanisms are currently meshed with revenue management systems
to achieve this effect, but the results are not always desirable. For example, a passenger
wanting to buy a super saver ticket for a 9 AM flight from Los Angeles to New York
might be told that all the seats available at that fare on the requested date are sold. The
traveler now has several alternatives: buy a more expensive ticket on the desired flight,
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fly at a less desirable time (e.g. a "red eye" or perhaps the same flight the next day), try
the competition, or not fly at all. Every one of these alternatives from the airline's
perspective should represent a failed opportunity to meet a customer's need.
Additionally, the prospective passenger's ultimate decision will affect demand statistics
which the airline relies upon for future forecasting. However, the airlines currently have
no way of knowing whether the passengers who flew on today's 9 AM flight really
wanted to fly on the flight or whether it was an "undesirable alternative." In this way,
variability is introduced into the system with no way of flushing it out. D3 will break
this cycle because aircraft capacity would be moved to conform with basic demand
patterns.
3.4 The Rubber Airplane
In 1986 an internal memo at the Boeing Company was written describing an
operating concept based upon a "rubber" airplane, 6 A few years later, Berge and
Hopperstad of Boeing wrote what is the seminal paper on demand driven dispatch, the
formal name for the "rubber" airplane concept.2 As a reminder, demand driven dispatch
uses demand forecasts from the revenue management system and subsequent passenger
bookings to dynamically adjust aircraft assignments as the date of departure approaches
to optimize profit. How this is done will be developed in a subsequent chapter. In their
paper Berge and Hopperstad conclude that demand driven dispatch could improve airline
earnings and could be feasibly applied to any route network regardless of its fundamental
structure or size. Other noteworthy conclusions from the paper are:
- The major elements necessary to run a demand driven dispatch operation, namely
aircraft with common flight crew ratings, reservations systems capable of
forecasting demands and flexible enough to accommodate aircraft changes, and
computing capability, are all currently available.
- Operating profit on hub and spoke dominated networks can be improved in the
range of 2 to 4 percent.
- The source of the benefits comes not only from increased revenue but better
utilization of aircraft. In some case studies the latter was even the majority
- 19 -
component. This has implications for fleet planning as well. There was some
indication that demand driven dispatch with smaller aircraft will generate as much
revenue as the fixed assignment method using larger aircraft. Smaller aircraft
require less capital investment.
. Relative to the fixed schedule, load factors (the number passenger miles flown
divided by the number of seat miles flown) rise by a couple percentage points
while spill (demand not satisfied because of unavailability of a fare product) dips
slightly.
. Large-scale aircraft assignment problems can be solved heuristically to near
optimal levels in a short time.
- Even with switching of aircraft assignments, tail number-specific activities like
maintenance can be accomplished.
The demand driven dispatch model and case studies used in preparation of this report will
be presented in the next section. Differences and similarities with the Berge and
Hopperstad model will also be discussed.
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Chapter 4: Demand Driven Dispatch Simulation
4.1 Simulation Overview
The simulation used to test the potential of demand driven dispatch under a
variety of conditions is essentially composed of two separate functional modules, the
revenue management module and the aircraft assignment module, which function
independent of each other except during the exchange of data. Each module will be
described in detail below. Before this is done, a flowchart of the integrated process
(Figure 4.1) is presented.
Each simulation consists of a set of 200 iterations of the complete booking and
assignment process. The number of iterations is a compromise between simulation run
time (30 minutes per run on a multi-user VaxStation 9000) and data points needed to
demonstrate statistical significance of results. As each iteration commences, the revenue
management module at the initial booking revision point evaluates probabilistically the
likelihood of passenger bookings by fare class and leg for the specified aircraft capacities
for the entire booking process. Later revision points will subtract seats already filled
from the various capacities.
With this information, initial booking limits are set and revenue estimates become
available. Revenue management systems in general seek to maximize the revenue
generated by passenger bookings by attempting to balance the opportunity cost of an
empty seat which could have been sold to a low fare, discretionary passenger against the
ability to offer a seat to high fare, non-discretionary customer who typically books closer
to the departure date. It should be noted that the revenue management system does not
attempt to fill each seat in the aircraft since this will not likely maximize revenue. A
thorough explanation of the revenue management methodology used in this paper,
Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) can be found in Belobaba 7 . EMSR is a
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Fig. 4.1: Flowchart of Demand Driven Dispatch Simulation
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heuristic model for maximizing revenue on the flight leg level given nested fare classes.
Briefly, the general concept of EMSR is that expected revenue is the product of the
probability of the unconstrained passenger demand for a seat in a specific fare class and
the fare associated with that seat. The example in Table 4.1 shows why holding a seat for
Table 4.1: Simple Revenue Management Example
assen er 1 Passen er 2
Booking Probability 0.20 0.80
Fare $1000 $200
Expected Revenue $200 $160
a passenger who is less likely to book could make sense from a revenue standpoint. Even
though a particular seat held for Passenger 1 will remain empty 80% of the time, on
average the airline will come out $40 ahead in revenue than if it sold the seat to Passenger
2. This example illustrates that it is not always obvious from which fare class the next
most valuable expected revenue seat will come.
Costs of operating the different type of aircraft are then calculated considering
performance characteristics of the aircraft (expected fuel burn for a flight leg based upon
operating weights, block time) and the expected passenger load. Referring to the
example in Figure 4.2, this latter figure will be always be less than the aircraft seating
capacity. The magnitude of the difference will grow with aircraft size since the
probability of booking successive passengers trends downward. The expected passenger
curve is not smooth. While not obvious in Figure 4.2, it is actually quite jagged because
the probability of a booking a passenger is not the dominant concern. Maximizing
revenue is the goal. In contrast, Figure 4.2 shows that the derivative of the expected
revenue line will always be negative, a direct result of the revenue management system
prioritizing seats on the basis of revenue. Contributions to operating profit are then
simply the difference between the expected revenues and costs. Variable costs for items
like meals need not be included since they are the same regardless of the type of aircraft
the passenger ultimately flies. They are also small enough in magnitude (a few dollars)
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Figure 4.2: Expected Revenue and Passenger Load versus Aircraft Capacity
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so that we can reasonably expect the revenue from any seat sold to cover them.
The next step in the process is the communication of the revenue and cost
information to the optimization module. The optimization module within the bounds of a
set of specified operational constraints then finds the aircraft assignment combination
which is expected to maximize profit. Some of the studies which will be discussed later
in the paper look at the effects on profits of "turning off' the optimal assignment module
at different points in the booking cycle. A decision box modeling this option appears in
the flowchart for this reason.
With booking limits set and aircraft assignments completed, the simulator
proceeds to randomly generate passenger bookings based upon the probabilistic demands
that have been fed into the revenue management model. The outcome statistics for events
like seats booked, revenue earned, and demand spilled are then tabulated. The simulation
then returns to the initial step of estimating demands for the remaining periods and so on.
This loop will be executed at every booking revision point. When the final revision point
is reached, the final statistics for the run are saved for post processing, the model is reset,
and the next iteration commences.
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4.2 Simulation Specifics
We have tried to simulate as realistically as possible the booking patterns, fare
classes, fares, costs, etc. that one is likely to find in typical hub and spoke operation of a
major airline. The revenue management module is an extension of the revenue
management and booking process work done by Williamson 8 . The demand driven
dispatch module was written specifically for this thesis. A comparison of characteristics
between the revenue management model in this thesis and the one utilized by Boeing
appears in Table 4.2. While the Boeing studies were designed to highlight general trends
over an entire route network, this model has purposely been created to encompass more
revenue management detail with the goal of characterizing parametric changes in demand
driven dispatch performance in a hub and spoke network. The greater number of booking
revision points and fare classes used in my revenue management module will assure that
any discernible differences in profit will be largely attributable to the demand driven
dispatch optimal assignment routine. With this level of resolution, EMSR revenue
benefits will approach the possible maximum magnitude. 1 1 Because the booking process
and fare class definitions more accurately reflect actual airline practice, the magnitudes of
the numerical differences are also likely to be closer to what would be expected under
realistic conditions.
A major feature of the Boeing model was the use of a continuously moving
"planning window." The planning window extended one week into the future. In this
concept the demand driven dispatch routine searches throughout the next seven days of
the schedule for globally optimal switch opportunities and makes appropriate assignment
changes. In this manner schedule feasibility will always be assured while permitting
switching anywhere in the system.
Schedule feasibility in the demand driven dispatch version in this thesis is assured
because the aircraft are on a daily cycle. While the flexibility of switching outside the
hub is a nice feature, one should realize that both versions of demand driven dispatch are
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constrained in some way. In the Boeing version, future decisions are dependent upon
previous decisions. The degree to which this is so depends upon the number of days
between decisions. Given that a decision has been made for Day 1, the ability to
optimally assign aircraft to maximize profit from Day 2 is somewhat compromised. The
chances of having aircraft placed optimally for Day 10 operations are much better. In this
model, the slate is wiped clean each day, but we contend with the same aircraft being
assigned to the outbound and inbound leg.
As the number of legs the aircraft must fly before returning to the hub increases,
the effectiveness of the thesis method decreases because of demand imbalance. Consider
a plane which must fly to other cities beyond the initial spoke destination before returning
the hub for the next connecting bank. The probability of one aircraft type being well-
matched in terms of capacity to each of the legs is not high. For this reason, the aircraft
itineraries in my simulation are restricted to fly only roundtrips between a hub and spoke.
Even so, in all likelihood one would expect some demand imbalance even over a single
roundtrip. Several of the scenarios to be examined in this thesis will address the demand
imbalance issue. Unless an airline has an infinite supply of aircraft, a compromise on
assignment flexibility will exist in every operational scheme in one form or another.
Finally, the Boeing model penalizes spill and denied boardings. Spill relates to
the number of passengers whose requests for a specific fare could not be satisfied.
Denied boardings occur as a consequence of flights being oversold or, in the case of
demand driven dispatch, swapping a smaller aircraft for a larger aircraft on a leg whose
bookings exceed the capacity of the smaller aircraft. The costs of spill and denied
boardings are based upon things like lost revenue potential and passenger inconvenience.
Quantifying these costs is a difficult and sometimes arbitrary exercise. The demand
driven dispatch routine in this thesis does not take the costs of these two items into
consideration when solving for the optimal assignment. Spill data will, however, be
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recorded, and the specific formulation of the assignment algorithm (See Explanation of
Constraints in Section 4.2.4.2) precludes denied boardings.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Study Simulations
Boeing Generic MIT
Case Study Hub and Spoke Model
Revenue Management EMSR EMSR
Methodology
Assignment Time Frame Planning Window Daily Cycle
Booking Revision Points 3 10
Fare Classes 2 7
Spill Penalized Measured
Denied Boardings Penalized Not Allowed
4.2.1 Hub and Spoke Network
A daily cycle at a mythical Dallas-Fort Worth "in and out" connecting hub with
15 spokes will be assumed in all studies. Because the flight legs outbound from and
inbound to the hub will be purposely constrained to be flown by the same set of physical
aircraft, the number of required aircraft is equivalent to the number of spokes. This set of
aircraft will be defined as the switching pool. The daily cycle begins during a connecting
complex and not necessarily at a specific time of day. Because aircraft flying in hub
networks often overnight in spoke cities, the daily cycle might be defined by the 24 hour
period commencing at the 5 PM connecting complex as opposed to the time the airport
opens in the morning. The simulation aircraft are Boeing 737s with an equal number (5)
of each type assigned to the pool of aircraft available for switching. The passenger
capacities for each aircraft in the series are shown in Table 4.3 The spoke cities were
selected on the criteria that they have varied distances from the hub, and that operations
with every member of the 737 family were possible. Baseline aircraft






assignments for both the outbound and inbound leg and flying distances are shown in
Table 4.4. Baseline demands in these markets, which will be discussed later in Chapter 6,
will be influenced by these assignments. This specific assignment combination attempts
to evenly allocate aircraft types over the flight distances and will remain the same in all
static scenarios. The static scenario simulations will be used for comparison with
demand driven dispatch scenario simulations and are meant to represent the fixed
assignment operations currently practiced by airlines.
Table 4.4: Spoke Cities and Baseline Assignments
Spoke City Distance (Miles) Baseline Asinnt
Austin TX 183 737-500
San Antonio TX 246 737-300
Wichita KS 329 737-400
Albuquerque NM 569 737-500
Denver CO 645 737-300
Phoenix AZ 868 737-400
Mexico City MEX 935 737-500
Salt Lake City UT 988 737-300
Las Vegas NV 1050 737-400
San Diego CA 1171 737-500
Los Angeles CA 1235 737-300
Oakland CA 1457 737-400
San Francisco CA 1465 737-500
Portland OR 1616 737-300
Seattle WA 1660 737-400
Because the flight legs in the base case vary greatly in distance, it is reasonable to expect
that over the course of a daily cycle an airplane could fly more Dallas-Austin legs than
Dallas-Seattle legs. This has been reflected in my model by weighting spoke city service
frequency according to distance from the hub. Table 4.5 shows the classification of hub
flight segment lengths into 3 general categories and the assumed daily cycle service
Table 4.5: Spoke Frequency Weighting Factors
Distance Category Mileage Range Number of
Daily Frequencies
Short Haul 0 to 350 4
Medium Haul 350 to 1000 2
Long Haul Over 1000 1
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frequencies. The demand driven dispatch simulation studies done for this thesis only
consider assignments made at the beginning of a daily cycle for the entire cycle. In the
case of short haul and medium haul flights, each of the multiple flights are equivalent in
the sense that the simulated demands are the same. Aircraft assignments were extended
to cover all of the flights in multiple frequency markets over the daily cycle. In reality, it
would be possible to consider aircraft switches at times of the day other than the when the
full complement of aircraft are in place to execute the main connecting bank. Figure 4.3
shows the airport load diagram for our mythical hub. Each peak represents a demand
Figure 4.3: Load Diagram for Simulation Hub
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driven dispatch opportunity for switching of aircraft. Swapping within these peaks would
be desirable in order to avoid the problem discussed earlier where aircraft are assigned to
many flight legs with non-uniform demands. As long as demand forecasts are available
for each occasion of service in multiple frequency markets, swapping internal to the daily
cycle can be readily written into the D3 assignment routine.
4.2.2 Revenue Management Module
Since the revenue management module in this simulation functions largely
independent of the aircraft assignment module, the simulation can be run with any
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revenue management methodology without modification. The EMSR nested leg heuristic
was chosen because it has been widely discussed in academic literature, is used in many
actual airline revenue management systems, and most importantly, was used in the
Boeing studies. While D3 performance might be better in concert with other revenue
management methodologies, it is not the point of this study to search for an optimal
match.
The specification of 10 booking limit revision points is similar to what is done in
present revenue management systems. The spacing of the revision points is typically one
week starting at 8 weeks before the flight with the exceptions to this pattern at the
beginning and end of the process. The initial "revision" is on the day the flight becomes
available for bookings (330 days before departure). The final revision usually occurs 3
days before the flight.
Passenger demands were generated assuming a Poisson arrival pattern. These
demands are defined for each booking period which commences after fare class purchase
limits have been set at the corresponding booking revision point. The Poisson arrival
pattern allows for random arrivals (in this case requests by passengers for various fare
class products) with the restriction that the mean arrival rate k be specified. Also, the
arrival events are independent of each other, and the probability of arrival in an interval
At is proportional to At. Given these assumptions, it can be shown that the distribution
of inter-arrival times is exponential 9 . The probability of n arrivals occurring in an
interval of length t under these conditions is defined by 10
P(n) =(Xt)et (n = 0,1,2,...)
n!
This distribution is the Poisson distribution. The use of the Poisson distribution in the
simulation of a booking process is described in Williamson 8 . Information pertaining to
the construction of the EMSR heuristic and its revenue impact can be found in Belobaba7
and Mak 1 .
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4.2.3 Aircraft Costs and Performance Characteristics
Estimates of total block hour aircraft operating costs minus fuel for the 737 series
of aircraft were provided by the Boeing Company. Fuel burn and flying times were
estimated using performance curves from 737 Operations Manuals12, 13 ,1 4 with the
following cruise condition assumptions:
. Long range cruise planning (M=.78)
. Flight Level 330
. Both engines operating
- Cabin air-conditioning on
. M=.74 climb and descent
Weight of an individual passenger with baggage is 200 lbs. The cost of a gallon of jet
fuel is 0.70 USD. Block hours were determined by adding 30 minutes of taxiing time to
flying time. Other aspects, like seating configuration, operator's empty weight, and
engine model, were selected to represent the options most often requested by airline
customers.
4.2.4 Aircraft Assignment Module
This is the key aspect of the demand driven dispatch scheme. Optimal assignment
decisions were determined using output from the following linear program. In the current
booking period p, we seek to
Maximize Cijxij
P f









i = 1,2,3 and represents the three different aircraft typesj = 1,2,...,15 and represents the 15 spoke aircraft itineraries from the hub
n = 1,2,...,10 and represents the number of booking periods
where
Cij is the contribution to profits expected with aircraft type i from
flying out of and back to the hub on the spoke connecting hub with
city j.
BKDREVj is the booked revenue on the roundtrip legs on spoke j over
the booking periods n = 1 to p. Booked revenue is equal to the
sum of the fares paid by each booked passenger.
EXPREVijn is the expected revenue figure from the revenue management
system for the roundtrip on spoke j for an aircraft with capacity
CAPi from the next booking period n = p+1 to the final booking
period n = f.
ACCOSTij is the total aircraft operating cost for aircraft type i for the
roundtrip on spoke j. ACCOSTij is a function of aircraft
performance characteristics, the price of fuel, weight of passengers
(firm plus expected bookings) and baggage, and roundtrip flight
mileage.
NACi is the number of aircraft type i in the switching pool
BKDPAXOj is the number of bookings on the hub to spoke city j leg
BKDPAXIj is the number of bookings on the spoke city j to hub leg
The decision variables xij are not specified as integer. However, because the linear
programming formulation represents a balanced transportation problem, we are assured
that the optimal solution will have integer values as long as the supplies and demands are
integers15 . This is indeed the case. The "supplies" are the numbers of each aircraft type,
and the "demands" are the requirements that one aircraft be assigned to each flight leg.
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4.2.4.1 Explanation of Decision Variable Coefficients
The decision variable coefficients Cij reflect the total operating profit obtained
from operating a specific aircraft type on the roundtrip legs. Since our model assumes
that the same tail number aircraft must fly the inbound and outbound leg, the revenues
and costs from the inbound and outbound leg can be collapsed into one variable. There
are three components of the coefficient: the booked revenue for all previous periods for
the number of passengers that have been booked on each leg, the expected revenue for the
remaining periods for each aircraft type on each leg, and the cost of operating each
aircraft type on each leg. Note that the BKDREV figure, which accounts for revenue for
a specific leg accumulated in all previous booking periods, does not vary by aircraft type.
Thus, if on a particular leg there are 130 passengers booked up to the current booking
revision point, the corresponding BKDREV will be a component in the coefficient for the
108 seat 737-500 in the present aircraft swapping analysis. Constraints 3 and 4, however,
preclude the 108 seat aircraft from being assigned to this particular set of inbound and
outbound legs.
4.2.4.2 Explanation of Constraints
Constraint 1 specifies that each aircraft in the switching pool must be assigned.
Constraint 2 prevents the assignment of more than one aircraft to an outbound/inbound
itinerary. Constraints 3 and 4 forbid the assignment of an aircraft to a leg whose capacity
is less than the number of bookings on both the outbound and inbound flights. The
consequence of this is that denied boardings (i.e. overselling) is not allowed. While
overbooking strategies were not used in this study, expanding the capability of the
simulation to include this feature would simply require multiplying capacities at each
booking revision point on each leg by an "overbooking factor" and adjusting bookings for
cancellations.
- 33 -
4.2.5 Fares and Booking Patterns
Fares in each fare class were derived from flown revenue figures in each of the
actual origin-destination markets. This data was provided to MIT by Delta Air Lines.
The seven fare classes represent the range of fare products available in the coach cabin of
the aircraft. In theory the fare levels are a function of mileage with prescribed discounts
applied to fare classes in proportion to the level of restrictions. Twenty-one day advance
purchase and Saturday night stay are examples of restrictions placed on the cheapest
tickets. Flown revenue per passenger in a fare class often differs from the "formula" due
to circumstances like competitive pressure or promotional programs. Booking patterns
by fare class were also constructed based upon actual booking trends (See Chapter 5).
Generation of demands in the simulation via a Poisson process requires the
definition of X, the mean arrival rate. A Poisson random variable process has the
property that X = a2 where c2 is the variance. Obviously the mean arrival rate of
booking requests in each period in each fare class on each leg should be equal to the
similarly defined mean demand data t used by the revenue management module (X = ).
Therefore, in order to have the revenue management module set fare class booking limits
which faithfully reflect the random nature of the booking process, the variance of
passenger booking arrivals must equal the mean demand.(a 2= pt) The point of this
derivation is to show that once the demands are specified (forecasting from historical
data), the use of a Poisson process for simulation implicitly fixes what the variance of the
demands should be. If the actual variances differ greatly from the Poisson variances, then
one should consider another probability distribution function to model the process.
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Chapter 5: Practical Aspects of D3 in a Hub Environment
5.1 Airline Reluctance in the United States
Though some major airlines in the United States have expressed interest in the D 3
philosophy, not a single one has yet incorporated D3 into their daily operations. D3 is
clearly a radical idea, and part of the blame for its lack of acceptance has been a less than
thorough evaluation by the airlines of the changeover and long term costs of running a D3
assignment process relative to the fixed aircraft assignment mode. Berge and Hopperstad
address the major issue of aircraft maintenance and conclude that multiple opportunities
for maintenance would still exist in a D3 environment. However, there are many other
practicalities which must conform to D3 without adverse effects on operating costs and
passenger expectations. It is an all or nothing proposition as well. If a single aspect of
the airline operation cannot be performed acceptably in a D3 environment, then it is
doubtful that an airline would ever implement the methodology. The necessary
adaptations of current practices in fundamental operational areas which need to be made
to allow for D3 operations are the subject of the following section of the thesis.
5.2 Scheduling
At every point in the booking process the reservation and revenue management
system must have knowledge of the number of seats on the aircraft which will be
assigned to each flight leg. This condition also must be met by D 3 . Upon initial
scrutiny, this condition seems to impose a difficult obstacle to the implementation of D3 .
On the one hand we are saying that in a D3 system the aircraft assignments are
potentially changing at each booking revision point. However, at the same time, we must
always know the complete set of available specific leg capacities. A simple way to
bridge these two restrictions in a hub and spoke system is to create fixed switching pools
of aircraft from which the D3 decision tool can then assign optimally to flight legs.
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Additionally, the exact composition of the pool (i.e. the number of each aircraft family
member) must not vary from day to day. This suggests two basic tail routings (Figure
5.1) which I have termed the autonomous and linked hybrid hubs.
Figure 5.1: Hub Aircraft Routings
Autonomous Hub Linked Hub
Hub
Spoke/Line Station
In the autonomous hub, specific tail numbers are assigned to the hub so that every
24 hours the same aircraft are collocated at the hub for possible assignment switches. In
a linked hub system, identically composed pools of aircraft travel from hub to hub over
the daily cycle. The principal benefit to this latter form is a flight schedule which will
more likely meet marketing requirements for ideal arrival and departure times when the
connecting banks through the hub serve short and long haul flights among city pairs
spread across several time zones.
Today's major airline hub and spoke networks in the United States are actually a
superimposition of the autonomous and linked concept. Therefore, running a D3 system
would in all likelihood require little alteration to current flight schedules. The ultimate
extension of assignment flexibility for this model would be similar to the switching posed
by Berge and Hopperstad. As stated earlier, their Boeing model allows for the possibility
of switches anywhere in the route system, not just the hub. For the purpose of analyzing
the impact of non-hub switching within the framework of this simulation, a constraint
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assuring that the composition of the pool of aircraft at the hub remain unchanged would
still be required. Figure 5.2 shows an example of how this switching could be
accomplished. At spoke station A aircraft types 1 and 2 are switched. In order to meet
the composition restriction, the D 3 routine must also recommend a switch of types 1 and
2 at another station (B) in a way that the overall profit to the airline is still increased.
Of course the switches at stations A and B will force further switches at other
spoke stations which must be feasible and profit enhancing. Spoke switching is a
completely feasible activity at an airline today with the aid of the multitude of scheduling
applications on the market. For readers interested in this aspect of the problem, Berge
and Hopperstad discuss at length the complexity and associated practicalities of
identifying switching opportunities over the entire route network.





/r-r- - Aircraft Type 2
The results in this report are based on an autonomous hub system. The
autonomous hub was chosen because it is a reasonably simple introduction to D3 and the
order of magnitude of the payoff could be quickly quantified over a variety of demand
characteristics. Airlines would probably seek to implement more complicated D3
strategies once convinced of its worth.
- 37 -
5.3 Flight Crews
For each aircraft type in an airline's fleet, pilots bid on flights with priority given
to those with the highest seniority. In D3 there should be no major change to the trip bid
process since the pilots can still fly their desired itineraries. The schedule will still be set
well ahead of the departure date. However, as mentioned previously, there is a
fundamental assumption being made with regard to this issue. Families of aircraft like
the Boeing 737 carry similar type ratings. This means that pilots are legally allowed to fly
any plane in the series without recurrent training or a familiarization check on a
simulator. With D3 it is possible that over the course of the day/trip the flight crew might
end up flying each aircraft series several times but never fly the same series back to back.
A potential safety concern might arise with continued exposure to slightly different
aircraft handling characteristics and critical performance parameters like rotation, takeoff,
and landing speeds. It is felt that this obstacle can be overcome since the aircraft in the
737 or any other family are by definition very similar. Also, adjusting to a new aircraft
would not require additional pilot workload, just additional vigilance. This might even be
a desirable action because changing aircraft types frequently might reduce the buildup
over the day of complacency and fatigue which could result in operational mishaps.
5.4 Cabin Crew
This issue is actually more complicated than the flight crew issue since the FAA
mandates the minimum number of cabin staff which must be assigned to an aircraft on
the basis of passenger load and aircraft capacity. Under D 3 an airline might find itself in
the situation where aircraft assignments are changed because of a surge of demand late in
the booking process. Like pilots, flight attendants also bid on trips on the basis of
seniority. Flight attendant union rules likely prohibit the last minute forced switching of
personnel.
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A way to avoid this situation is to extend itinerary bidding rights only to the
number of most senior flight attendants needed to minimally staff all aircraft in the pool.
Those attendants low in seniority would not have specific itinerary bid privileges but
would be able to bid on itinerary lengths, dates, etc. With this system in place, these
attendants could then be assigned as late as the day of the flight. Since the aircraft for a
specific pool would be collocated at regular intervals, these "pool attendants" could be
reassigned to other aircraft as necessary and would stay with the aircraft pool until it
returned to a personnel switchout station (i.e. a major hub).
5.5 Ticketing/Seat Assignment
Since the exact seating layout for a flight might not be known until the day of
departure under D3 , some consideration must be given to how seating assignments would
be handled. A proposed solution requires the renumbering of aircraft rows so that a
boarding pass sent to a passenger would remain valid regardless of when it was issued or
of the final aircraft assignment. Seats would also have to be assigned to passengers from
the rear section of the plane to the front. The desire to handle seat assignments in this
manner can be explained with the help of the table below. In the initial stages of the
booking process, it is possible that any of the three aircraft types could hold the current
Table 5.1: Alternative Row Numbering Scheme
737-40T 25 1 5N
737-400 25 1 25
737-300 21 5 25
737-500 18 8 25
assignment for a flight leg. In this situation no seat should be assigned with a row
number less than 8. With each booking period aircraft assignments will be reevaluated
and larger aircraft will be made available in most cases to those legs whose projected
demand is greatest. When the number of passengers booked on a leg exceeds the
minimum capacity of the smallest aircraft but is less than the largest aircraft, seat
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assignments can be made for rows 5 through 7. Assuming that bumping of passengers is
not allowed, passengers assigned to rows 5 through 7 will always hold a valid boarding
pass since it is not possible for their flight to be assigned the 737-500. The same
argument holds once bookings for a flight exceed 128 (the capacity of the 737-300). Any
passenger assigned a seat in rows 1 through 4 will know that the assigned aircraft cannot
be any one other than the 737-400. On the other hand, a passenger assigned to a row
higher than row 8 cannot predict in advance which aircraft from the 737 family will be
assigned to his/her flight.
Booking from the rear of the aircraft also carries with it the advantage that
passengers who book latest in the booking process, i.e. the high-yield passenger, will get
a seat near the front of the aircraft. This creates a last-in, first-out situation which is
considered desirable by the business traveler. However, in situations where a flight is
being heavily overbooked, an airline would likely require seats to be assigned at the gate.
5.6 Ground Servicing
This aspect of operations will be largely unchanged with minor exceptions. In the
case where specific aircraft are assigned to a single hub, the destination of the next flight
leg for an aircraft at a spoke station will always be the hub. Since the aircraft type might
vary from day to day, fueling requirements will be different. However, this is usually the
case anyway because of variations in enroute weather, passenger load, etc. What will
also be changing frequently is the aircraft destination beyond the hub. For example, on
one occasion the aircraft will arrive at the hub as part of a connecting complex and depart
for City A. The next day the final destination might be City B. To expedite passenger
processing at the hub, it is advantageous to place bags going to the final destination at the
rear of the cargo hold to minimize baggage handling time at the hub. Ground crews
should be aware that the final destination, and thus the direct flight that the aircraft
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represents, will likely change on a daily basis. Thus, the switches that will be made at the
hub must be known before the incoming flights depart.
In general, the communications structure of the airline's organization would have
to be capable of quickly updating information systems and personnel on the multitude of
changes likely to occur each day. This is not a major problem since airlines tend to be
quite sophisticated in information systems technologies anyway. If a small airline is not
capable of disseminating updated information to all its line stations, it probably also does
not have the sophisticated revenue management technology and staff necessary to run in a
D3 environment.
5.7 A European Example
The non-overseas operations of many airlines in Europe are conducted in a
manner analogous to the hub and spoke model described in this thesis. One airline,
KLM, applies D3 to their European network through their Amsterdam hub. The process
KLM uses to identify switch opportunities is similar to that embodied in this simulation.
Based on demand data from the revenue management system, certain legs are flagged for
service by larger aircraft. Information on assignment recommendations is sent to the
scheduling department with a list of possible replacement legs for the smaller aircraft.
In an interesting twist, KLM swaps assignments among 737-300s, 737-400s, and
Airbus A310s. They do not operate 737-500s. Because of a restriction imposed by the
airline's agreement with its pilots concerning itinerary changes, assignments must be
fixed 10 days in advance of the flight. Itinerary changes occur in this case because the
Boeing and Airbus aircraft do not carry similar pilot type ratings.
While results from D3 have not been quantified, the fact that KLM has been using
D3 for some time must attest to their satisfaction. Even with the additional crew
scheduling obstacle, KLM has demonstrated that D3 operations are possible in an actual
airline environment. Airlines in the United States should take notice.
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Chapter 6: Outline of Study Scenarios
Two types of studies on the impacts of demand driven dispatch were conducted
for this thesis. The first block of eight studies span a simulation matrix in three
dimensions: load factor distribution, leg demand balance, and booking pattern. Within
each dimension there are two assumption states which presents a total of 23 = 8
combinations. Each of the studies compares results over a range of demand multipliers
between a fully dynamic simulation (aircraft assignments evaluated in every booking
period) to the corresponding static simulation where aircraft assignments are invariant.
Demand multiplier and leg load factor are defined as
Demand Multiplier = Scenario Demand , andBaseline Demand
Leg Load Factor = BookingsCapacity'
The other group of two studies look at the sensitivity of the demand driven dispatch
process itself to varying the number of booking periods when aircraft assignments may be
revised.
6.1 Dimension One: Load Factor
Average load factors (demand multiplier = 1.0) were selected to be 0.65, a
representative annual average figure for U.S. airlines. This was modeled two ways. The
first method assumes that a route planner is deciding among aircraft in the fleet which
should serve a leg on the basis of achieving a load factor of 0.65. Working in reverse, the
mean demands on a leg between the hub and the spoke were "found" to have values equal
to 65% of the capacities of the three aircraft types. Assigning aircraft to the inbound and
outbound flight itinerary could then simply be done by inspection. With five aircraft of
each type, the demand distribution would have several peaks as shown in the histogram in
Figure 6.1. The mean demand in this scenario is 0.65 * 128 = 83.2 passengers.
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Figure 6.1: Planned Load Factor Alternative







The second approach was to smooth out demand by assuming a normal distribution with
the same mean as the first alternative of 83.2 and a k factor of 0.3 The k factor is defined
as
k factor = Standard DeviationMean
The 15 leg demands were created by selecting equally spaced probability percentiles
along on the normal distribution curve between 15 and 85 percent. The distribution of
demands in this instance would resemble Figure 6.2. Aircraft were assigned such that the
smallest capacity 737 would fly the legs with the five lowest demands, the mid-sized 737






the legs with the next five larger demands, and the largest 737 the legs with the five
greatest demands.
6.2 Dimension Two: Balance of Leg Demands
The baseline assumption for this study was to assume that the mean passenger
demand on the leg from the hub to a particular spoke would be equal to the demand from
that spoke city to the hub. This could be applicable to the situation where the daily cycle
for aircraft assignments begins in the morning and ends in the evening of the same day.
The level of demand for air travel during these periods is often markedly higher than at
other times during the day. Because of the peaking characteristics shared by both time
periods, the assumption that demand would be roughly equivalent over time on the basis
of balance of flow considerations does not seem unreasonable. If the hub served many
nearby markets (i.e. predominantly local traffic), one might expect this trend to be
reinforced because of a commuter-type effect.
In other situations, the assumption of bi-directional demand equality might not
hold. If the aircraft daily assignment cycle begins and ends in the middle of the day,
there is not likely to be a consistent pattern of demand in each direction common to all
market pairs, especially if they are separated by one or more time zones. Another
argument against equal leg demands is that in a multi-hub network where much of the
passenger traffic is connecting through the hub, there are several itinerary options
connecting spoke cities. For example, if many passengers preferred for some reason to
connect through Dallas on their way from Los Angeles to Boston and through Chicago on
the return trip, the demand on the Los Angeles-Dallas leg might vary from the demand on
the Dallas-Los Angeles leg.
There is also a day of the week effect. Consider a market where business travel
predominates. Very few business trips are likely to be initiated Friday morning but a
large number will likely conclude before the weekend. Thus, demand might be lower in
the morning and higher in the evening relative to the average over the entire week.
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In some sense there is probably a lot of "canceling out" of these effects, but the
imbalance applicable to the situation modeled in this thesis is not likely to vanish
completely. To examine what impacts the demand imbalance might have on demand
driven dispatch, alternate demand data scenarios for the simulation were generated where
the demand on one leg of a closed hub-spoke flight itinerary was increased by 10% and
demand on the other leg was decreased by 10%. Because the same aircraft is constrained
to fly both legs, it does not matter which leg demand is increased and which is
suppressed.
6.3 Dimension Three: Booking Patterns
Booking patterns or curves describe the demand for fare class products over the
booking process. If the overall percentage of passengers seeking a seat in fare class i is
FCi and the fraction of overall bookings which occur in fare class i in booking period j is
PERij, then the demand DEMj for a particular fare class i in period j with a cabin level
demand DEM is DEMij = DEMx FC x PERij. Two booking patterns, one which
exemplifies a typical booking demand pattern on short and medium haul fights and
another more representative of a booking pattern shifted closer to the date of departure,
were chosen for the study. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 contain the percentage breakdowns of
aggregate demand into fare class and booking period demand. Fare classes are arranged
in descending order by fare. The accompanying Figure 6.3 shows the cumulative buildup
of bookings over all fare classes throughout the booking process. One can observe in the
late booking curve the noticeable shift of the curve to the right relative to the typical
booking curve. This represents a difference in total bookings on a specific day before the
departure of the flight.
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2: Simulation Incremental Booking Curves
Table 6.1: Typical Booking Pattern
Days Before Departure








0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09
0.05 0.05 0.09 0.11
0.10 0.12 0.13 0.16
0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08
0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08
0.08 0.12 0.15 0.17
0.09 0.12 0.18 0.20








Table 6.2: Late Booking Pattern
Days Before Departure
CLASS MIX 56 49 42 35 28 21 14 7 3 0
Y 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.29
B 0.26 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.20
M 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.04 0.03
H 0.02 0.26 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.04
Q 0.08 0.39 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.04
K 0.21 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.06
















Figure 6.3: Buildup of Bookings
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56 49 42 35 28 21 14 7 3 0
Days Before Departure
- - - - - Typical Booking PatternLate Booking Pattern
Chapter 7: Presentation of Results
7.1 Raw Simulation Outputs
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 are examples of simulation output results for the scenario
where demands are distributed and balanced, and a late booking pattern is assumed.
Most of the items are self explanatory with the possible exception of the first five
columns underneath Flight Leg Summary. From left to right, the columns show the
airport codes for the origin and destination city and the number of daily roundtrips, the
average capacity of the aircraft assigned to the flight leg over all iterations, and the
number of assignments made to each aircraft type in the 200 iteration runs for the 737-
500, 737-300, and 737-400. Table 7.1 is the static case where assignments are fixed.
Therefore, each leg has only one aircraft type, the baseline aircraft type, assigned 200
times. Contrast this with the results on Table 7.2 The total number of assignments on
each leg is 200, but the assignments on several legs are spread over more than one aircraft
type. This spreading of aircraft assignments is the result of demand driven dispatch
optimization efforts.
The leg designation of multiple aircraft types in our hub, or "swapping volatility"
if you will, is actually not that high as it might first appear. Three city pairs (DFW-SAN,
DFW-LAX, and DFW-LAS) have no swapping occurring whatsoever, and only four city
pairs (DFW-PHX, DFW-SAT, DFW-SFO, and DFW-ICT) are ever assigned all three
aircraft types. Maximum volatility would occur when each aircraft type is assigned to a
leg 200/3 = 66 2/3 times. I would characterize a substantial level of swapping activity as
the case where each aircraft type is assigned to a leg a minimum of 30 times. The
swapping activity in the case shown in Table 7.2 is representative for what was seen in
most other studies. Some studies did exhibit increased volatility on some legs, but
averaged over the entire hub the activity levels were not remarkably high.
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TABLE 7.1: DISTRIBUTED DEMANDS (MU=.65*128,SIGMA=.3*MU)/BALANCED/TYPICAL
SIMULATION SIZE: 200
DEMAND DISTRIBUTION: POISSON
LEG DEMANDS ADJUSTED BY 1.00
STANDARD DEVIATION FACTOR: 0.
NUMBER OF CAPACITY REVISIONS (0=EMSR): 0
MEAN REVENUE: 492979.16
MEAN FLIGHT COST: 219875.41
MEAN PROFIT: 273103.75














































































































































AVERAGE HUB LOAD FACTOR: 0.65
AVERAGE HUB YIELD: 14.22
UNIT AIRCRAFT COST: 4.13
AVERAGE REVENUE PER PAX: 101.75
AVERAGE REVENUE PER AVAILABLE SEAT:































































































































TABLE 7.2: DISTRIBUTED DEMANDS (MU=.65*128,SIGMA=.3*MU)/BALANCED/TYPICAL
SIMULATION SIZE: 200
DEMAND DISTRIBUTION: POISSON
LEG DEMANDS ADJUSTED BY 1.00
STANDARD DEVIATION FACTOR: 0.
NUMBER OF CAPACITY REVISIONS (0=EMSR): 10
MEAN REVENUE: 4 92 97 9. 31
MEAN FLIGHT COST: 217708.09
MEAN PROFIT: 275271.22















































































































































AVERAGE HUB LOAD FACTOR: 0.67
AVERAGE HUB YIELD: 14.22
UNIT AIRCRAFT COST: 4.18
AVERAGE REVENUE PER PAX: 101.75
AVERAGE REVENUE PER AVAILABLE SEAT:































































































































7.2 Output Form Explanation
Output forms with data from the simulation scenarios are presented later in this
chapter. Two graphs will accompany each scenario output form. These graphs highlight
the effects of demand driven dispatch relative to the static simulations on two key
parameters, the change in airline profit and utilization of the three types of aircraft. In the
latter part of this chapter, the results of the dynamic sensitivity analysis are presented and
explained.
The output forms have four separate blocks for displaying static base case data,
demand driven dispatch data, absolute difference between demand driven dispatch data
and static base case data, and percentile difference data. Formulations from which the
data were calculated are outlined below.
. REVENUE is the average over all iterations and legs of the money earned
throughout a complete booking process cycle from passenger bookings in each
fare class multiplied by the respective fare.
. COST comes from the average flight operating costs for the hub over all iterations
scaled to full total operating costs. Flight operating costs comprise about 45% of
total operating costs with ground and system operating costs making up the
difference 1 6 . The non-flying costs which were calculated for the static base case
were also used to generate total costs in the demand driven dispatch case under
the assumption that ground and system operating costs would not markedly
change in demand driven dispatch operations.
. PROFIT equals REVENUE minus COST.
. SPILL (%) is the average over all iterations and legs of the percentage of
passengers who desired to purchase a fare product but could not because either the
aircraft had been filled or the booking limit for a fare class as recommended by
the revenue management module had been reached.
. LOAD FACTOR equals RPMs divided by ASMs. RPMs is the average number
of passengers on each leg multiplied by the leg mileage flown in each iteration.
ASMs is the average number of seats on each leg multiplied by the leg mileage
flown in each iteration. This is the definition of load factor at the network level.
. YIELD equals REVENUE divided by RPMs expressed in cents per passenger
mile.
. UNIT COST equals COST divided by ASMs expressed in cents per available seat
mile.
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. UTILIZATION equals the average over all iterations of the number of hours
flown by a single aircraft of each aircraft type during the execution of the
schedule as represented by the frequency-weighted legs into and out of the hub
7.3 Significance Testing
The results were also tested for statistical significance. Specifically, the null and
alternative hypotheses subjected to a difference of means testing are
Ho : PROFITstatic = PROFITD and
Hi : PROFITDs 3PROFITstatic.
The calculated test statistic for this test is 17
C = Ki-a tatic/n + &23/m
where
PROFIT is the average profit,
C is the constant chosen to reject Ho if PROFITDs - PROFITstatic C to
a specified significance level a,
Ki-a the value taken from the normal distribution table for a specified
significance level ax,
Y2  the variance in the simulation of PROFIT, and
n,m the number of data points (simulation iterations). In all simulation
runs n = m = 200.




7.4.1 Results and Analysis of Scenario * 65% Plapped Load Factor
- Balanced Demauds
. Typical Booking Pattern
The level of added contribution from demand driven dispatch peaks at $2,379 per
daily cycle at demand multiplier 1.0 and gradually declines over the range of demand
multipliers (Figure 7.1.1). Significance testing to a 90% confidence level in this (and all
other) cases requires a contribution difference of approximately $1500. Since all
contribution differences above demand multiplier 1.2 fall below this level, no
performance difference between the static and demand driven dispatch model can be
statistically claimed at this significance level. Even so, the downward sloping trend in
the Additional Profit versus Demand Multiplier graph are seems to fit expected behavior.
As demand is increased, the revenue management module sets lower booking
limits for the lower yielding passengers because the opportunity to fill the aircraft with
higher yielding passengers improves. As demand starts to spill, the simulation reaches
the point where almost any seat still available can be sold to a high fare passenger. Also,
the variability in demand on the legs where the demands are greatest is reduced relative to
the other legs. Recall that the variance in demand in each fare class and booking period is
equal to the mean of that demand. However, the spread in demand about the mean as
signified by the k factor goes down as demand rises since the standard deviation is equal
to the square root of the variance. Thus at higher demand multipliers the booking
demands take on a more deterministic appearance with the largest demand legs
approaching this state more rapidly than the others. The end result is that as overall
variability in the hub is lowered, the static case aircraft assignments which were based on
deterministic demands become increasingly attractive. With the demand driven dispatch
assignments looking more and more like the static case assignments, the profit
differential disappears.
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Another result is that the role of revenues and costs in the composition of profit
gains complete reverses over the range of demand multipliers. This can be seen in the D3
Relative Difference data block. At lower demand multipliers, the model attempts to
increase profits by reducing costs. There is really no other option since there is little
demand spill in either the static base case or dynamics D3 case, which means the revenue
is going to be the same regardless of the aircraft assignments. As demand multipliers
rise, note how D3 attempts to increase revenue. At this point the high yield passenger
demands are strong enough to allow the model to diminish in importance the smaller cost
flight cost differences.
The data also offers a very important lesson on why financial statistics taken in
isolation can be misleading. Every airline these days is rightfully talking about cutting
costs. Unit cost is commonly used as the figure of merit in these exercises. Imagine a
group of airline managers who are asked to evaluate whether to switch to demand driven
dispatch operations solely on the basis of cost effectiveness. They are told that current
unit costs are 8.26 O/ASM, and that under D3 they would rise to 8.36 O/ASM. My guess
is that a majority would choose to remain with the present fixed assignment system. If
this were indeed the case, the majority would be wrong.
A paradoxical feature of a D3 system is that it can reduce overall costs by
increasing unit costs. This is accomplished by increasing the utilization of smaller,
higher unit cost aircraft in situations where a larger aircraft cannot be filled. Overall costs
are reduced because trip costs for smaller aircraft are generally lower than they are for
larger aircraft. Figure 7.1.2 shows how the D3 utilization of the 108 seat 737-500 goes up
1.5 hours per day (22.7%) relative to the static case. At the same time the D3 utilization
of the 148 seat 737-400 drops by almost the same number of hours -1.3 (18.1%). This
trading of hours between these two aircraft will be seen in each of the eight case studies.
As the demand multiplier rises, the bar graph of Figure 7.1.2 takes on the appearance of a
damped system response as the utilizations slowly revert to those of the static case.
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A positive differential in load factors in the D3 simulations implies that smaller
aircraft are being used on longer legs in situations of weaker than average demand. Since
no passengers are being spilled at low demand multipliers, the number of revenue
passenger miles is the same in the static and D3 case. The only way that the overall hub
load factors can rise in D3 is if fewer seat miles are flown. This is accomplished where
economically justifiable by having higher than average leg load factors on smaller aircraft
on long legs and lower than average load factors on larger aircraft on short legs.
We have established that the $2,379 contribution increase at demand multiplier
1.0 is statistically significant, but is it financially significant? The static run at demand
multiplier 1.0 confirms that the cost and revenue models in the simulation are roughly
correct in that it predicts a profit of only $1,563 on revenues of $490,170. Of course the
results would have been more realistic if a loss had been shown. This happens in other
scenarios. In this case, though, the $2,379 represents an increased profit from one daily
cycle of 152%! Since one daily cycle involves on average two roundtrips to the hub, it
would probably be roughly equivalent to two connecting banks. Referring to average hub
and spoke characteristics presented in Chapter 2, if we were to assume that an airline
could operate 4 similar daily cycles D3 per day of 30 aircraft each at 5 hubs, the direct
scaled yearly revenue profit increase would be approximately $35 million. While not a
major windfall (about 0.3% of sales at an airline like American), this benefit can be
achieved every year with low one time startup costs. Other harder to quantify benefits
might be derived from more accurate demand forecasts.
At higher demand multipliers, the added contribution, even if it had remained at
the $2,379 level, does not amount to much. This is because the static case contribution is
very high, equivalent to 32% return on sales.
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Table 7.3: 65% Load Factor, Balanced Demands, Typical Booking Scenario
Base Case Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 490,170 540,029 588,543 636,111 680,507 719,296
Operating Cost ($) 488,607 488,740 488,873 489,002 489,118 489,196
Contribution ($) 1,563 51,289 99,670 147,109 191,389 230,100
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.30 1.30 3.99
Load Factor 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.84 0.90 0.93
Yield (O/RPM) 14.17 14.19 14.18 14.19 14.25 14.46
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) f
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 490,170 540,019 588,589 636,502 680,968 719,556
Operating Cost ($) 486,228 486,839 487,693 488,717 489,170 489,382
Contribution ($) 3,942 53,180 100,896 147,785 191,798 230,174
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 1.19 3.84
Load Factor 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.85 0.90 0.94
Yield (O/RPM) 14.17 14.19 14.18 14.19 14.25 14.47
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.36 8.32 8.32 8.30 8.30 8.30
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 7.1 7.6 7.4 7.2 7.2 7.2
737-400 6.0 6.1 6.7 7.2 7.4 7.4
737-500 8.1 7.5 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.6
D3 Difference Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 0 -10 46 391 461 260
Operating Cost ($) -2,379 -1,901 -1,180 -285 52 186
Contribution ($) 2,379 1,891 1,226 676 409 74
Statistically Significant? Yes Yes No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0 0 -0.02 -0.1 -0.11 -0.15
Load Factor 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Yield (O/RPM) 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
Unit Cost (O/ASM) 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
737-400 -1.3 -1.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.1
737-500 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent Differences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Operating Cost -0.5% -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution 152.2% 3.7% 1.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.0%
Spill 0.0% 0.0% -66.7% -33.3% -8.5% -3.8%
Load Factor 1.5% 2.8% 1.3% 1.2% 0.0% 1.1%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Unit Cost 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 -2.7% 3.4% 1.1% -1.2% -1.2% -1.6%
737-400 -18.1% -16.0% -8.9% -1.5% 0.7% 1.8%
737-500 22.7% 13.9% 8.6% 3.0% 0.6% -0.3%
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Figure 7.1.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
Over a Range of Demand Multipliers
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Demand Multiplier
Figure 7.1.2
Demand Driven Dispatch Daily Aircraft
Utilization Relative to Static Model
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7.4.2 Results and Analysis of Scenario * 65% Planned Load Factor
- Unbalanced Demands
. Typical Booking Pattern
This is the first scenario where the demands in each fare class on one hub-spoke
leg were increased by 10% and reduced by 10% on the return leg. Each hub and spoke
leg pair is still balanced in terms of overall passenger demand, but the total expected
revenue from the booking process will be different because variability changes which will
impact revenue management booking limits. It was initially anticipated that this might be
a favorable set of conditions for the D3 model given the relatively high spillage occurring
at high demand multipliers. Yet the results were quite similar to the planned load factor,
balanced demand, typical booking pattern case. The proposed explanation is that as
demand multipliers are increased, the legs with the higher demands begin to overshadow
the decreased demand legs in terms of revenue opportunities. Instead of 15 sets of
inbound and outbound legs of equal weight, the coefficients for expected contribution
become dominated by the 15 increased demand legs.
This being the case, the same downward sloping trend in contribution differential
as a function of demand multiplier (Fig 7.2.1) as seen in the balanced leg demand
scenario since the 10% factor is uniformly applied to all legs. Aircraft utilization patterns
are also similar.
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Table 7.4: 65% Load Factor, Unbalanced Demands, Typical Booking Scenario
Base Case A ctual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 492,154 541,212 591,132 636,525 677,300 714,296
Operating Cost ($) 488,611 488,747 488,880 489,000 489,091 489,160
Contribution ($) 3,543 52,465 102,252 147,525 188,209 225,136
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.02 0.19 1.09 3.01 6.18
Load Factor 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.92
Yield (g/RPM) 14.19 14.18 14.21 14.24 14.4 14.62
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours)
737-300 7.3 7.3 73 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 492,169 541,255 591,478 637,247 677,675 714,623
Operating Cost ($) 486,417 487,214 488,296 488,949 489,161 489,297
Contribution ($) 5,752 54,041 103,182 148,298 188,514 225,326
Spill (% Demand) 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.90 2.97 6.01
Load Factor 0.67 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.89 0.92
Yield (O/RPM) 14.19 14.18 14.2 14.24 14.4 14.62
Unit Cost (O/ASM) 8.34 8.32 8.30 8.30 8.30 8.30
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) P
737-300 7.3 7.5 7.4 7.2 7.3 7.2
737-400 6.0 6.4 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.4
737-500 7.9 7.4 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.6
D3 Derence Reatve to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 15 43 346 722 375 327
Operating Cost ($) -2,194 -1,533 -584 -51 70 137
Contribution ($) 2,209 1,576 930 773 305 190
Statistically Significant? Yes Yes No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0.01 -0.01 -0.1 -0.19 -0.04 -0.17
Load Factor 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Yield (O/RPM) 0 0 -0.01 0 0 0
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) '
737-300 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
737-400 -1.3 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
737-500 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent DRearences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0%/ 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Operating Cost -0.4% -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution 62.4% 3.0% 0.9% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1%
Spill 0.0% -50.01 -52.6% -17.4% -1.3% -2.8%
Load Factor 3.1% 1.4% 1.3% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Unit Cost 1.0% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7
737-300 0.00 2.3% 1.0 -1.8% -0.4% -1.6%
737-400 -18.1% -12.3% -4.1% 0.00 0.0% 1.8%
737-500 19.7% 12.1% 4.5% 1.5% 0.0% -0.3%
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Figure 7.2.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
Over a Range of Demand Multipliers
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Demand Multiplier
Figure 7.2.2
Demand Driven Dispatch Daily Aircraft
Utilization Relative to Static Model
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7.4.3 Results and Analysis of Scenario * Distributed Load Factor
. Balanced Demands
. Typical Booking Pattern
The magnitude of the results from this scenario (demand multiplier =1.0) are
similar to those in the planned load factor case. There are couple of new trends which do
emerge. Most noticeable is the upturn in added contribution that takes place at demand
multipliers beyond 1.3 (Figure 7.3.1). Again, the data are not statistically different from
the static case to the 90% level of significance. It would probably be possible to
demonstrate significance at higher demand multipliers with something like a pair wise t-
test, but the magnitudes of the contributions are so small as to be nearly inconsequential.
Yet there does seem to be an explanation for the behavior of the curve. At demand
multiplier =1.5, the D3 version is spilling 12% fewer passengers. Overall spill in the
distributed demand pattern is higher than the planned load factor demand model because
the load factors of some flights at demand multiplier 1.0 are already in the 80% range.
Thus, significant spill will start appearing at lower demand multipliers.
The contribution difference at the higher demand multipliers is derived mostly
from revenue gains from the additional number of passengers booked. The operating
costs with D3 are actually higher than those in the equivalent static case.
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Table 7.5: Distributed Loads, Balanced Demands, Typical Booking Scenario
Base Case Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue (N) 492,979 542,934 592,099 638,880 682,125 717,596
Operating Cost ($) 488,611 488,747 488,880 489,002 489,107 489,173
Contribution ($) 4,368 54,187 103,219 149,878 193,018 228,423
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.69 2.42 5.89
Load Factor 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.89 0.92
Yield (#/RPM) 14.22 14.23 14.23 14.26 14.37 14.58
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 A ctual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 492,979 542,918 592,199 639,402 682,956 719,059
Operating Cost ($) 486,444 487,123 488,090 488,990 489,230 489,448
Contribution ($) 6,535 55,795 104,109 150,412 193,726 229,611
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.51 2.04 5.17
Load Factor 0.67 0.73 0.79 0.85 0.90 0.93
Yield (O/RPM) 14.22 14.23 14.23 14.26 14.4 14.61
Unit Cost (g/ASM) 8.36 8.34 8.34 8.32 8.32 8.32
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) '
737-300 7.1 7.4 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.3
737-400 6.3 6.3 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.3
737-500 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.7 6.6 6.6
D3 Difference Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 0 -16 100 522 831 1,463
Operating Cost ($) -2,167 -1,624 -790 -12 123 275
Contribution ($) 2,167 1,608 890 534 708 1,188
Statistically Significant? Yes Yes No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0 0 -0.03 -0.18 -0.38 -0.72
Load Factor 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Yield (O/RPM) 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.03
Unit Cost (#/ASM) 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
737-400 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
737-500 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent Differences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Operating Cost -0.4% -0.3% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Contribution 49.6% 3.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%
Spill 0.0% 0.0% -33.3% -26.1% -15.7% -12.2%
Load Factor 3.1% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Unit Cost 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7
737-300 -2.7% 1.0% -1.8% -0.4% 1.0% -0.4%
737-400 -14.1% -13.7% -6.8% -1.4% -1.4% 0.0%
737-500 21.2% 15.2% 9.1% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0%
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Figure 7.3.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
Over a Range of Demand Multipliers
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Demand Multiplier
Figure 7.3.2
Demand Driven Dispatch Daily Aircraft
Utilization Relative to Static Model
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7.4.4 Results and Analysis of Scenario * Distributed Load Factor
- Unbalanced Demands
. Typical Booking Pattern
Any major deviation in the pattern of results in this scenario could be of interest
since the distributed load factor and unbalanced demand combination is likely to be what
would be encountered to some extent in actual airline operations. The contribution at
demand multiplier 1.0 is lower ($1961 versus about $2200) than in other cases. This
would lead to a smaller yearly profit increase than calculated in Section 7.4.1. The
magnitude of the difference in aircraft utilization of the 737-500 is also smaller (1.2
versus 1.5 in planned load factor, balanced demands), a good indicator of lessened D3
impact.
In other scenarios, graphs of Contribution Difference versus Demand Multiplier
displayed either a roll-off with unbalanced demands or increase with distributed loads at
high demand multipliers. What is seen in Figure 7.4.1 is a complete flattening out of the
curve. This suggests that the effects of unbalanced demand and distributed load are
largely independent and of similar magnitude to roughly cancel each other out. Thus,
even at high demand multipliers, demand driven dispatch will still deliver some
incremental benefit.
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Table 7.6: Distributed Loads, Unbalanced Demands, Typical Booking Scenario
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 496,040 544,175 592,828 638,650 678,487 716,722
Operating Cost ($) 488,618 488,749 488,878 488,993 489,080 489,149
Contribution ($) 7,422 55,426 103,950 149,657 189,407 227,573
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.07 0.51 1.84 4.09 7.40
Load Factor 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.91
Yield (O/RPM) 14.23 14.23 14.25 14.34 14.49 14.75
Unit Cost (#/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 496,031 544,253 593,306 639,481 679,534 717,829
Operating Cost ($) 486,657 487,579 488,626 489,072 489,295 489,374
Contribution ($) 9,374 56,674 104,680 150,409 190,239 228,455
Spill (% Demand) 0.01 0.04 0.33 1.53 3.56 6.72
Load Factor 0.67 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.92
Yield (g/RPM) 14.23 14.23 14.25 14.35 14.51 14.79
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.36 8.34 8.32 8.32 8.32 8.32
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) / //
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.4
737-400 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2
737-500 7.8 7.3 6.9 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 Difference Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) -9 78 478 831 1,047 1,107
Operating Cost ($) -1,961 -1,170 -252 79 215 225
Contribution ($) 1,952 1,248 730 752 832 882
Statistically Significant? Yes No No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0.01 -0.03 -0.18 -0.31 -0.53 -0.68
Load Factor 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Yield (O/RPM) 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.04
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7
737-300 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
737-400 -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
737-500 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent Differences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Operating Cost -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution 26.3% 2.3% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
Spill 0.0% -42.9% -35.3% -16.8% -13.0% -9.2%
LoadFactor 3.1% 1.4% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3%
Unit Cost 1.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) W
737-300 0.0% -0.4% -0.4% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
737-400 -16.8% -9.6% -2.7% -1.4% -1.4% -1.4%
737-500 18.2% 10.6% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Figure 7.4.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
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7.4.5 Results and Analysis of Scenario * Distributed Load Factor
- Balanced Demands
. Late Booking Pattern
This scenario repeats the pattern seen in earlier distributed load factor /balanced
demand simulations where D3 performance reaches a minimum at demand multiplier 1.3.
Balanced demands also produce slightly better contributions relative to unbalanced
scenarios. This is a direct result of lower demand spill.
The distributed load factor scenario contributions at most demand multipliers are
below those of planned load factors everything else being equal. In conjunction with
slightly higher variances between D3 and static results, the number of demand multiplier
points which meet the statistical significance test drops from two to one. The
contribution at demand multiplier 1.1 falls just outside the confidence interval. Because
the transgression is small and the shape of the curve on the whole in Figure 7.5.1 is about
as expected, I would tend to dismiss this point as an aberration caused by possible unique
data circumstances specific to this run.
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Table 7.7: Distributed Load, Balanced Demands, Late Booking Scenario
Base Case Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 479,302 527,377 574,362 620,653 663,671 701,975
Operating Cost ($) 488,584 488,716 488,844 488,971 489,078 489,160
Contribution ($) -9,282 38,661 85,518 131,682 174,593 212,815
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 1.64 4.54
Load Factor 0.64 0.70 0.76 0.93 0.87 0.92
Yield (#/RPM) 14.09 14.12 14.10 14.12 14.19 14.36
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) f
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 479,299 527,376 574,439 621,065 664,456 703,228
Operating Cost ($) 486,356 486,968 487,968 488,814 489,183 489,387
Contribution ($) -7,057 40,408 86,471 132,251 175,273 213,841
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.30 1.36 3.96
Load Factor 0.65 0.71 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.92
Yield (O/RPM) 14.09 14.12 14.10 14.11 14.20 14.40
Unit Cost (#/ASM) 8.38 8.34 8.32 8.32 8.32 8.32
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 7.1 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3
737-400 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.2 7.2 7.3
737-500 8.1 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.6
D3 Difference Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue($) -3 -1 77 412 785 1,253
Operating Cost ($) -2,228 -1,748 -876 -157 105 227
Contribution ($) 2,225 1,747 953 569 680 1,026
Statistically Significant? Yes Yes No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0 0 0.04 -0.12 -0.28 -0.58
Load Factor 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.01 0.00
Yield (#/RPM) 0 0 0 -0.01 0.01 0.04
Unit Cost (#/ASM) 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
737-400 -1.3 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
737-500 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent Diffrences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Operating Cost -0.5% -0.4% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution -24.0% 4.5% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%
Spill 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -28.6% -17.1% -12.8%
Load Factor 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% -10.8% 1.1% 0.0%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% 0.3%
Unit Cost 1.5% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7
737-300 -2.7% 1.0% -0.4% -0.4% 1.0% -0.4%
737-400 -18.1% -15.1% -8.2% -1.4% -1.4% 0.0%
737-500 22.7% 15.2% 9.1% 3.0% 0.0% -0.3%
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Figure 7.5.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
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Figure 7.5.2
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7.4.6 Results and Analysis of Scenario * Distributed Load Factor
. Unbalanced Demands
- Late Booking Pattern
The results of this simulation do not vary from those of other scenarios. The
demand driven dispatch algorithm works fairly well at demand multiplier 1.0 with
performance yielding constant returns at higher demand multipliers. Gains at the higher
end are made possible because D3 is spilling a smaller percentage of the demand at the
higher demand multiplier 1.5, 5.8% versus 6.22% for the static case. The difference in
the number of passengers spilled at this test point is 30.2. With an average revenue
difference of $969, this equates to an opportunity cost of $32 per passenger. The average
revenue per passenger is approximately $104 in both scenarios. This is a strong
indication the revenue management system is working properly since the passengers
being spilled must be coming from low fare demand.
The cost side results are also in line with what has been seen in the previous
studies. Unit costs are slightly higher in the D3 runs with hours being exchanged
between the 737-500 and 737-400.
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Table 7.8: Distributed Load, Unbalanced Demands, Late Booking Scenario
Base Case A tual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue($) 481,591 529,394 575,545 620,842 660,754 697,923
Operating Cost ($) 488,589 488,722 488,847 488,964 489,060 489,131
Contribution ($) -6,998 40,672 86,698 131,878 171,694 208,792
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.03 0.36 1.32 3.40 6.22
Load Factor 0.64 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.90
Yield (#/RPM) 14.12 14.09 14.11 14.16 14.28 14.5
Unit Cost (/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours)
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 481,579 529,403 575,943 621,654 661,683 698,896
Operating Cost($) 486,568 487,355 488,425 489,025 489,219 489,313
Contribution ($) -4,989 42,048 87,518 132,629 172,464 209,583
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.03 0.22 1.05 3.04 5.80
Load Factor 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.83 0.87 0.91
Yield (O/RPM) 14.12 14.09 14.11 14.16 14.29 14.52
Unit Cost (9/ASM) 8.36 8.34 8.32 8.32 8.30 8.30
Aircraft Utilization (Hours)
737-300 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3
737-400 6.1 6.5 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.3
737-500 7.9 7.4 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.6 6
D3 Difeence Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue($) -12 9 398 812 929 973
Operating Cost ($) -2,021 -1,367 -422 61 159 182
Contribution (8) 2,009 1,376 820 751 770 791
Statistically Significant? Yes No No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0 0 -0.14 -0.27 -0.36 -0.42
Load Factor 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Yield (OfRPM) 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02
Unit Cost (ASM) 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) o--0/00
737-300 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
737-400 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0
737-500 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 1
D3 Percent DRelrences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.00% 0.0%/ 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Operating Cost -0.4% -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution 28.7% 3.4% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4%
Spill 0.0 0.0% -38.9% -20.5% -10.6% -6.8%
Load Factor 1.6% 1.4% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.1%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Unit Cost 1.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours)
737-300 0.0% 1.0% -0.4% -0.4% 1.0% -0.4%
737-400 -16.8% -11.0% -4.1% -1.4% 0.0% 0.0%
737-500 19.7% 12.1% 6.1% 1.5% 0.0% -0.3%
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Figure 7.6.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
Over a Range of Demand Multipliers
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Figure 7.6.2
Demand Driven Dispatch Daily Aircraft
Utilization Relative to Static Model
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7.4.7 Results and Analysis of Scenario - 65% Planned Load Factor
* Balanced Demands
. Late Booking Pattern
The highest contribution difference at demand multiplier 1.0 ($2,411) is generated
in this scenario. Because this occurs at a demand multiplier where there is no spill, the
improvement is entirely a result of lower costs. Not surprisingly, the 737-500 achieves
its highest utilization per day, 8.2 hours, in this scenario. Again, this means higher unit
costs in the D3 run versus the static case, but the overall costs come out lower because the
trip costs for the smaller aircraft are less than the larger aircraft.
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Table 7.9: 65% Planned Load Factor, Balanced Demands, Late Booking Scenario
Base Case A ctul Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 476,184 524,683 570,646 618,519 662,890 702,168
Operating Cost ($) 488,582 488,716 488,840 488,971 489,089 489,178
Contribution ($) -12,398 35,967 81,806 129,548 173,801 212,990
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.84 2.97
Load Factor 0.64 0.70 0.76 0.83 0.88 0.93
Yield (o/RPM) 14.04 14.04 14.05 14.05 14.09 14.23
Unit Cost (0/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
D3 Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 476,184 524,682 570,685 618,708 663,314 702,462
Operating Cost ($) 486,171 486,691 487,550 488,627 489,065 489,292
Contribution ($) -9,987 37,991 83,135 130,081 174,249 213,170
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.76 2.81
Load Factor 0.65 0.71 0.77 0.83 0.89 0.93
Yield (O/RPM) 14.04 14.04 14.05 14.05 14.09 14.25
Unit Cost (g/ASM) 8.36 8.32 8.32 8.30 8.30 8.30
Aircraft Utilization (Hours)
737-300 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.3 7.3 7.2
737-400 6.0 6.1 6.5 7.1 7.3 7.4
737-500 8.2 7.5 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.6
D3 Difference Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue($) 0 -1 39 189 424 294
Operating Cost ($) -2,411 -2,025 -1,290 -344 -24 114
Contribution ($) 2,411 2,024 1,329 533 448 180
Statistically Significant? Yes Yes No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0 0 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.16
Load Factor 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Yield (#/RPM) 0 0 0 0 0 0.02
Unit Cost (#/ASM) 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) /
737-300 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1
737-400 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.1
737-500 1.6 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent Differences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Operating Cost -0.5% -0.4% -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution 19.4% 5.6% 1.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1%
Spill 0.0% 0.0% -50.0% -38.5% -9.5% -5.4%
Load Factor 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0%
Yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Unit Cost 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7
737-300 -2.7% 3.7% 2.3% -0.4% -0.4% -1.8%
737-400 -18.1% -16.4% -11.0% -2.7% 0.0% 1.4%
737-500 24.2% 13.6% 9.1% 3.0% 0.0% -0.3%
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Figure 7.7.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
Over a Range of Demand Multipliers
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Demand Multiplier
Figure 7.7.2
Demand Driven Dispatch Daily Aircraft
Utilization Relative to Static Model
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7.4.8 Results and Analysis of Scenario * 65% Planned Load Factor
- Unbalanced Demands
- Late Booking Pattern
The results from this scenario simulation are not remarkably different from other
simulations - contributions drop with increasing demand multiplier, spill is relatively high
at high demand factors, and utilization patterns are typical.
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Table 7.10: 65% Load Factor, Unbalanced Demands, Late Booking Scenario
Base Case Actual Data
Demand Multiplier
Revenue($) 478,380 526394 573,552 617,574 659,754 696,388
Operating Cost ($) 488,587 488,720 488,849 488,969 489,069 489,142
Contribution ($) -10,207 37,674 84,703 128,605 170,685 207,246
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.70 2.28 5.21
Load Factor 0.64 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.87 0.91
Yield (#/RPM) 14.04 14.04 14.05 14.05 14.17 14.39
Unit Cost (/ASM) 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
Aircraft Utilization (Hours)
737-300 7.3 7. 3 7.3 7.3
737-400 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
737-500 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue ($) 478,373 526,390 573,752 618,234 660,185 696,629
Operating Cost ($) 486,349 487,007 488,050 488,807 489,078 489,246
Contribution ($) -7,976 39,383 85,702 129,427 171,107 207,383
Spill (% Demand) 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.53 2.21 5.08
Load Factor 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.91
Yield (OfRPM) 14.04 14.04 14.05 14.05 14.18 14.40
Unit Cost (ASM) 8.34 8.32 8.32 8.30 8.30 8.30
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 11 ,01 .:
737-300 7.3 7.5 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.2
737-400 6.0 6.3 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.4
737-500 7.9 7.4 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.6
D3 Diffrence Relative to Base Case
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue($) -7 -4 200 660 431 241
Operating Cost ($) -2,238 -1,713 -799 -162 9 104
Contribution ($) 2,231 1,709 999 822 422 137
Statistically Significant? Yes Yes No No No No
Spill (% Demand) 0 0 -0.06 -0.17 -0.07 -0.13
Load Factor 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Yield (O/RPM) 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01
Unit Cost (#/ASM) 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) '
737-300 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
737-400 -1.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1
737-500 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
D3 Percent Diffrences
Demand Multiplier
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Revenue 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Operating Cost -0.5% -0.4% -0.2% 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
Contribution -21.9% 4.5% 1.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1%
Spill 0.000 0.0% -50.0% -24.3% -3.1% -2.5%
Load Factor 1.6% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0%
Yield 0.0%0 0.00 0.0% 0.0 0.1% 0.1%
Unit Cost 1.08 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Aircraft Utilization (Hours) 7/
737-300 0.00 02.% -0.4% 0.40 -0.4% -1.6%
737-400 -18.1% -13.7% -5.5% -1.4% 0.0% 1.8%
737-500 19.7% 12.1% 6.1% 1.5% 0.0% -0.3%
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Figure 7.8.1
Profit Increase With Demand Driven Dispatch
Over a Range of Demand Multipliers
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Demand Multiplier
Figure 7.8.2
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7.5 Sensitivity Analysis of Dynamic Nature of Demand Driven Dispatch
Tables 7.11 and 7.12 show data from simulations runs where the demand driven
dispatch module was "turned on" and "turned off" over the entire range of possible
booking revision points. Regardless of whether D3 was being used or not, the revenue
management module was invoked. The reason for doing such an analysis is to determine
for airlines which might not wish to run D3 assignment programs at every booking
revision point for every flight on a daily basis the fewest number of assignment revision
points and their occurrence in the booking process necessary to achieve good profit
enhancement results. In all likelihood the answer to this question will heavily depend
upon the distribution of and booking patterns for demand. The two scenarios examined
here are planned load factor / balanced demand / typical booking and distributed load
factor / balanced demand / typical booking at demand multipliers 1.0 and 1.5.
"Turning off" the D3 process is defined as running the D3 module at every
booking revision point prior to the specified revision point and thereafter skipping over
D3 in the simulation at every revision point. "Turning on" represents the opposite action.
The D3 module is not run until a certain booking revision point is reached, and then it is
run until the end of the booking process. By definition the contribution from the situation
where the final booking period is the last revision point in the "turn off" case must equal
the contribution from the situation where the initial booking period is the first booking
revision point in the "turn on" case. Both of these points are equivalent to running D3
over the entire booking process.
7.4.1 Planned load factor / Balanced demand / Typical booking
At demand multiplier 1.0, Figure 7.9.1 shows a sharp rise in contribution with the
between the zeroth and first assignment revision point. In fact, 85% of the total possible
contribution increase from using the D3 process is gained between these two points. Of
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course turning off D3 at assignment point 0 is the same as saying that the simulation is
being run under static conditions. Terminating D3 at assignment point 1 is analogous to
running D3 just once at the start of the booking process. This is a very important result
since it means that if airlines could assign their aircraft at the beginning of the booking
process for a flight many months away just on the basis of probabilistic fare class demand
analysis (as opposed to aggregate level analysis used at many airlines), they can gain a
large percentage of the D3 benefits without running a full blown D3 assignment process.
Detailed demand data is supplied by the revenue management system, so it is crucial that
the revenue management and demand driven dispatch functions be highly integrated to
ensure timely relay of updated information. Over the rest of the booking periods, there is
a gradual upward trend towards the final contribution figure. Thus, at every booking
revision point where D3 is run, there is on average some marginal benefit.
Where Figure 7.9.1 shows that large benefits can be gained by running D3 just
once, Figure 7.9.2 shows how contribution drops depending upon how late in the booking
process the first D3 assignment is made. Clearly if an airline chose to run D3 at the final
booking revision point, which corresponds to the day of the flight, it would bear some
opportunity cost. Figure 7.9.2 suggests that as late as the seventh revision point, or 14
days before the flight, the airline can determine D3 assignments without a perceptible
drop in contribution.
That this transition point occurs 14 days before departure is not likely a matter of
coincidence. Many airlines set purchase restrictions which require passengers seeking
discount fares to book seats by 14 days before the flight. Even though passengers have
the option of booking well before the 14 day cutoff, the uncertainty inherent in planning
any future event promotes increased booking activity as fare class advance purchase
deadlines approach. Figure 6.3 shows that almost 50% of passenger bookings in the
typical model occur in the last four booking periods. More importantly, since these
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bookings represent predominantly higher yield passengers, the percentage of revenue
booked over these periods is even greater.
In fairness it should be pointed out that the worst result is relatively small, only
$170 (4.3%) lower in contribution. Why so low? One must remember that at demand
multiplier 1.0 there is no spill whatsoever (Table 1.3). This in turn is a result of my
demand models not having enough variability and/or high enough base load factors.
Under these circumstances we are in the situation where running D3 just once at any point
in the booking process is sufficient. Spill is more common in real life because load
factors are not so controlled. Additionally, fare class demands are broken out to the full
origin-destination level as opposed to the leg level. This is important because it means
that for a given demand level the variability will be higher when the demand is composed
of many smaller, more volatile (higher k factor) market demands as opposed to a single
aggregate demand.
At demand multiplier 1.5, there is no dramatic jump in contribution between the
static case (last assignment revision point = 0) and any demand driven dispatch "turn off"
point. The curve in Figure 7.9.3 even shows a drop in contribution at last assignment
revision point = 2. There are separate phenomena at work in this situation. First, the
level of spill at high demand multipliers is such that most of the contribution
improvements come from the revenue side, and there are plenty of high revenue
passengers to fill seats. Load factors in this instance are over 90%. Secondly, aircraft
seats come in discrete quantities. Therefore, it is possible that a more costly assignment
solution is found in anticipation of simulated bookings which do not materialize. With no
further revisions possible after the last revision point, the revenue management system
must make the best of the flawed assignments.
Figure 7.9.4 shows an uneven decline in contribution as the first assignment
revision point is varied. A definitive break appears again appears at assignment revision
point 7 for most likely the reason stated previously. In both Figures 7.9.3 and 7.9.4 the
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absolute changes are so low, on the order of a couple hundred dollars in comparison to
the static value of about $230,000, as to be essentially insignificant in economic terms.
7.4.2 Distributed load factor / Balanced demand / Typical booking
As seen with the results in the demand multiplier sensitivity section, there are no
major differences in the results between distributed load factor and planned load factor
scenarios. The nominal demand multiplier (1.0) cases in fact look identical with slight
differences only in absolute contribution levels (Figures 7.10.1 and 7.10.2). In this
scenario too there is no spill at this demand multiplier to cause a larger drop at late
assignment points in Figure 7.10.2.
At demand multiplier = 1.5, the "turn off" response of demand driven dispatch
(Figure 7.10.3) differs from the planned load factor case in the fact that the upward trend
in contribution rises more steadily. However, the number of dollars is so small that it
would be stretching the point to attach any significance.
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Table 7.11: Sensitivity Analysis - Changing Number of A/C Assignment Revision Points
Planned Load Factor of 65%/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.0
Last Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $490,170 $489,816 $489,960 $490,156 $490,077 $490,092 $490,163 $490,160 $490,157 $490,170 $490,170
Flight Cost $219,873 $217,477 $217,562 $217,766 $217,653 $217,597 $217,721 $217,617 $217,626 $217,580 $217,494
Total Cost $488,607 $486,211 $486,296 $486,500 $486,387 $486,331 $486,455 $486,351 $486,360 $486,314 $486,228
Contribution $1,563 $3,605 $3,664 $3,656 $3,690 $3,761 $3,708 $3,809 $3,797 $3,856 $3,942
Planned Load Factor of 65%/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.5
Last Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $719,296 $719,296 $719,147 $719,186 $719,324 $719,282 $719,358 $719,429 $719,474 $719,504 $719,556
Flight Cost $220,138 $220,138 $220,197 $220,126 $220,183 $220,167 $220,213 $220,248 $220,261 $220,269 $220,324
Total Cost $489,196 $489,196 $489,255 $489,184 $489,241 $489,225 $489,271 $489,306 $489,319 $489,327 $489,382
Contribution $230,100 $230,100 $229,892 $230,002 $230,083 $230,057 $230,087 $230,123 $230,155 $230,177 $230,174
Planned Load Factor of 65%/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.0
First Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $490,170 $490,170 $490,170 $490,170 $490,170 $490,170 $490,170 $490,156 $490,078 $490,050 $489,996
Flight Cost $217,494 $217,494 $217,494 $217,494 $217,494 $217,494 $217,494 $217,494 $217,493 $217,491 $217,490
Total Cost $486,228 $486,228 $486,228 $486,228 $486,228 $486,228 $486,228 $486,228 $486,227 $486,225 $486,224
Contribution $3,942 $3,942 $3,942 $3,942 $3,942 $3,942 $3,942 $3,928 $3,851 $3,825 $3,772
Planned Load Factor of 65%/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.5
First Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $719,556 $719,296 $719,515 $719,483 $719,381 $719,411 $719,432 $719,033 $718,906 $718,719 $718,679
Flight Cost $220,324 $220,138 $220,327 $220,326 $220,329 $220,338 $220,333 $220,345 $220,292 $220,317 $220,321
Total Cost $489,382 $489,196 $489,385 $489,384 $489,387 $489,396 $489,391 $489,403 $489,350 $489,375 $489,379
Contribution $230,174 $230,100 $230,130 $230,099 $229,994 $230,015 $230,041 $229,630 $229,556 $229,344 $229,300
Figure 7.9.1
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Table 7.12: Sensitivity Analysis - Changing Number of A/C Assignment Revision Points
Distributed Load Factor/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.0
Last Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $492,979 $492,776 $492,822 $492,813 $492,876 $492,869 $492,915 $492,967 $492,969 $492,977 $492,979
Flight Cost $219,875 $217,753 $217,806 $217,756 $217,814 $217,793 $217,818 $217,894 $217,856 $217,781 $217,708
Total Cost $488,611 $486,489 $486,542 $486,492 $486,550 $486,529 $486,554 $486,630 $486,592 $486,517 $486,444
Contribution $4,368 $6,287 $6,280 $6,321 $6,326 $6,340 $6,361 $6,337 $6,377 $6,460 $6,535
Distributed Load Factor/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.5
Last Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $717,596 $717,596 $718,575 $718,234 $718,438 $718,410 $718,819 $718,876 $718,874 $718,974 $719,059
Flight Cost $220,128 $220,128 $220,429 $220,235 $220,301 $220,253 $220,346 $220,395 $220,390 $220,399 $220,403
Total Cost $489,173 $489,173 $489,474 $489,280 $489,346 $489,298 $489,391 $489,440 $489,435 $489,444 $489,448
Contribution $228,423 $228,423 $229,101 $228,954 $229,092 $229,112 $229,428 $229,436 $229,439 $229,530 $229,611
Distributed Load Factor/Balanced Demands/Typical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.0
First Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $492,979 $492,979 $492,979 $492,979 $492,979 $492,979 $492,971 $492,918 $492,756 $492,704 $492,631
Flight Cost $217,708 $217,708 $217,708 $217,708 $217,708 $217,708 $217,708 $217,704 $217,688 $217,686 $217,682
Total Cost $486,444 $486,444 $486,444 $486,444 $486,444 $486,444 $486,444 $486,440 $486,424 $486,422 $486,418
Contribution $6,535 $6,535 $6,535 $6,535 $6,535 $6,535 $6,527 $6,478 $6,332 $6,282 $6,213
Distributed Load Factor/Balanced DemandsfTypical Booking
Demand Multiplier = 1.5
First Revision Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Revenue $719,059 $719,044 $719,044 $719,026 $718,993 $718,904 $718,818 $718,399 $717,985 $717,935 $717,800
Flight Cost $220,403 $220,401 $220,401 $220,403 $220,403 $220,416 $220,449 $220,380 $220,317 $220,359 $220,307
Total Cost $489,448 $489,446 $489,446 $489,448 $489,448 $489,461 $489,494 $489,425 $489,362 $489,404 $489,352
Contribution $229,611 $229,598 $229,598 $229,578 $229,545 $229,443 $229,324 $228,974 $228,623 $228,531 $228,448
Figure 7.10.1
Effects on Contribution from
"Turning Off' Demand Driven Dispatch
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Last Assignment Point
Figure 7.10.2
Effects on Contribution from
"Turning On" Demand Driven Dispatch




















0 1 2 3 4 5 6
First Assignment Point
Figure 7.10.3
Effects on Contribution from












0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Last Assignment Point
Figure 7.10.4
Effects on Contribution from












0 1 2 3 4 5 6
First Assignment Point
7 8 9 10
- 88 -
Chapter 8: Conclusions
Demand driven dispatch in airline hub operations can improve airline profit
margins under certain conditions on the order of tens of millions of dollars annually. The
best results obtained in this study were at load factors similar to those seen in the airline
industry today. It was initially thought that the positive impacts of demand driven
dispatch would carry through to higher demand situations as well. This was discovered
not to be the case because opportunities for revenue generation are plentiful even in the
static scenario that as long as revenue management systems are in place, the difference
will be negligible.
In situations where profit was most significantly improved, the demand driven
dispatch algorithm achieved these results by minimizing costs. This was done by
radically changing the aircraft utilization pattern of the Boeing 737 family with respect to
the static case. Daily utilization was greatly increased in the demand driven dispatch
simulations for the smallest aircraft, the 737-500, by over an hour per airplane
(approximately 20% change). Consequently, the daily utilization of the largest aircraft,
the 737-400, was reduced by the roughly same amount on a per plane basis. This
produced the situation where unit costs were higher in the demand driven dispatch runs
relative to the static runs, but overall costs were lower because the demand driven
dispatch model considers only trip costs. In situations where there was variability and
low spill (i.e. demand multiplier 1.0) it made sense profit-wise to use the smaller aircraft
more extensively because of lower trip costs. Variability in bookings and revenues drops
when passenger demand greatly exceeds available capacity. Thus, as demands rise, the
utilization rates drift back towards the static case assignment values since this set of
aircraft assignments will capture by definition the greatest revenue under more
deterministic conditions.
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The results did not vary significantly with changes to the scenario definition. The
profit improvement was always greatest at demand multiplier 1.0 regardless of any
combination of demand distribution, leg demand balance, and booking process
assumptions. This suggests a high degree of robustness of demand driven dispatch
performance with regard to variable market conditions.
While it is difficult to make a direct comparison with the results from the Boeing
studies, the impact on profit improvement from this version of demand driven dispatch
was in general less (40%) than found with the Boeing model on a per airplane basis.
There are two possible explanations. First, the Boeing model does not capture enough
detail in the fare structure and booking process definitions. This suggests that demand
driven dispatch profit projections cited in the Boeing studies could be more optimistic
than those likely to be encountered in practice. However, it could also be true that the
planning window approach is simply better than the daily cycle approach used in this
thesis. Further study would be needed to determine the actual source(s) of the
discrepancy.
Studies on the effectiveness of demand driven dispatch when initiated and
terminated at different points in the booking process revealed two major conclusions.
The first is that most of the benefit to be gained from running a demand driven dispatch
reassignment routine at every booking revision point can be gained from performing the
analysis just once early in the booking process. This is a clear message that airlines are
limiting profit opportunities if aircraft assignments are made on the basis of aggregate
demand data alone. It logically follows that independent of whether aircraft assignments
are made upon consideration of deterministic or stochastic analyses, they must be made
on at least a day of week basis if demand variation is high. Assigning a single aircraft
type to a specific flight leg for an entire month will result in tremendous opportunity costs
under this circumstance.
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The second conclusion is that demand driven dispatch can be first used in the
booking process as late as the revision point where advance purchase constraints initially
come into play without a detrimental impact to profits. For example, the results from
starting demand driven dispatch at 56 days before the flight will not vary greatly from
those where demand driven dispatch assignments are initially made at 14 days before the
flight, a common advance purchase restriction imposed by the airlines. This is an
intuitive conclusion since passengers will typically not book restricted tickets until as late
as possible because of penalties for itinerary changes.
Practical issues concerning the day to day operation of an airline in a demand
driven dispatch environment were also examined. There seem to be no insurmountable
obstacles preventing implementation of demand driven dispatch operations at airlines in
the context of a multiple hub and spoke system. In fact, single hub and spoke systems
with demand driven dispatch aircraft assignments are in use today in Europe. While the
simulation runs only accounted for differences in flight operating costs, there is no
reason to believe that ground and/or system operating costs will rise with demand driven
dispatch. The major issue to be resolved in a large scale implementation would be the
scheduling of flight and cabin crews. Ultimately this question comes down to the
respective unions allowing for more work rule flexibility than exists in current contracts.
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Chapter 9: Directions for Future Research
Perhaps the most interesting extension of this research would be to incorporate the
ability to use demand driven dispatch not just once for a daily cycle, but for every
intervening point in the day when aircraft flying shorter legs have returned to the hub.
This would not require any great modification to the existing code but would necessitate
a greater number of market demand assumptions.
The utilization patterns of the aircraft suggest that the composition of the aircraft
pools might be altered so that the average capacity is reduced in such a way as to further
increase profits. Methods for finding the optimal composition under different demand
assumptions could explored.
There are also several leg assignment problems which could be addressed. For
instance, a method could be developed to decompose a highly connected network into a
set of either autonomous or linked hubs in such a way as to increase profit and while
maintaining as much as possible the original flight schedule. Allowing for spoke
switching among aircraft from different pools while maintaining overall fleet
composition in each hub is also an interesting problem.
Finally, simulations could be run with traffic demand based upon connecting
service for purposes of further realism. At present demands are only specified for each
directed leg between the hub and the spoke city. Origin-destination demands could be
specified on a spoke to spoke basis. More advanced revenue management techniques
could also be tested. From the demand driven dispatch perspective, these two particular
study directions would in all likelihood produce similar results to the cases in this study,
but one never knows for sure without testing.
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